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III. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. Ewing was given a driver's license suspension as a result of his failure of a breath test 
on March 16, 2014, pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-8002A. This is an appeal from the decision of the 
district court upholding the ALS hearing officer·s decision to suspend Mr. Ewing's license. The 
license suspension began on March 16, 2014, with a temporary license being good for thirty days. 
The hearing was set for April 10, 2014, over the objection of Mr. Ewing. 
Party Reference: The Idaho Transportation Department is referred to as "ITD" or 
"Department" for the purposes of this argument. Mr. Ewing is referred to by name. Idaho State 
Police Forensic Services is referred to as "ISP" or "ISPFS." 
Standard for Review: In Dru/fell v. State Department of Transportation, 136 Id. 853, 41 
P.3d 739 (2002), the Supreme Court set out the standard of review in matters dealing with the 
judicial reviews of administrative proceedings, the Court stated: 
"Under the IDAPA, the JTD's decision may be overturned only where its findings: 
a) violate statutory or constitutional provisions; b) exceed the agency's statutory 
authority; c) or made upon unlawful procedures; d) are not supported by substantial 
evidence in the record; ore) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. LC. 
Section 67-5279(3). 
At p. 855. See also Elias-Cruz v. Idaho Department ofTransportation, 153 Id. 200,280 P.3d 703 
(2012). Idaho Code § 18-8002A(7) sets out the burden of the driver to demonstrate to the Hearing 
Officer that driving privileges should be reinstated. The review of disputed issues of fact must be 
confined to the agency record for judicial review. I.C. §67-5277. I.C. §67-5279(1) sets out the scope 
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of review. Bennetf v. State o.lldaho, Department o/Transportation, 147 Id. 141,206 P.3d 505 (Ct. 
App. 2009). The Court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the 
evidence presented. Upon judicial review of an administrative hearing officer's order a Court may 
not set aside findings unless those findings are "not supported by substantial evidence on the Record 
as a whole" I.C. §67-5279(3)(d). Mahurin v. State ofldaho, Department of'Transportation, 140 Id. 
65, 99 P.3d 125, (2004). See also Gibbar v. State ofldaho. Department o/Transportation, 143 Id. 
93 7, 155 P.3d 1176, (Ct. App. 2006). The appropriate remedy pursuant to the Idaho Administrative 
Procedures Act is: " ... if the agency is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or in part and 
remanded for further proceedings as necessary." I.C. §67-5279(3). See Gibbar at p. 1181. The 
Idaho Supreme Court has held that the decision of the Transportation Department must be affirmed, 
unless the order violates statutory or constitutional provisions, exceeds the agency's authority, is 
made upon unlawful procedure, is not supported by substantial evidence, or is arbitrary, capricious 
or an abuse of discretion. Marshall v. Idaho Transportation Department. 13 7 Id. 3 3 7, 48 P .3d 666 
(2002 ). The party challenging the agency decision must demonstrate that the agency erred in a 
manner specified in LC. §67-5279(3) and that a substantial right of that party has been prejudiced. 
Gibbar v. State o.lldaho. Department of Transportation, 143 Id. 937, 155 P.3d 1176, (Id. App. 
2006). 
A hearing pursuant to I.C. § 18-8002A results in an agency action and is therefor governed 
by the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act. The constitutionality of a statute or administrative 
regulation is a question oflaw over which this court exercises free review. Wanner v. State, 151 Id. 
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164,244 P.3d 1250 (2011) at p. 1253. The Idaho Administrative Procedure Act governs the review 
of Department decisions to deny, cancel, suspend, disqualify, revoke or restrict a persons driver's 
license. See LC. §§49-330, 67-5270, 49-201, 67-5201(2). Bell v. Idaho Department of 
Transportation, 151 Idaho 659, 262 P .3d. 1030 (2011 ). 
IV. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND COURSE OF PROCEEDING 
Mr. Ewing was driving in Lewiston, Idaho, on March 16, 2014, at which time he was 
stopped, given field sobriety tests and arrested. He was given a breath test by the use of a Lifeloc. 
R at p. 34. The peace officer at no time in this record noted that the required performance 
verification was completed. Rat pp. 36,43. No performance verification was sent to ITO. For the 
Lifeloc a valid breath test would consist of two breath samples and a performance verification.Rat 
p. 216. A hearing was requested on March 18, 2014. Rat p. 54 ITO sent out subpoenas and other 
documents on March 24, 2014. Rat pp 85-92. A show cause letter setting the hearing outside the 
twenty (20) days statutory requirement was generated on March 24, 2014. Rat p. 262. An objection 
and request for hearing to this hearing date was filed on March 25, 2014. Rat p. 94. No hearing on 
the objection was allowed. The hearing officer seemed unaware of this objection in his decision. R 
at p. 141 A hearing was held over the objection on April 10, 2014. The license suspension was 
upheld.Rat p. 7. A timely request for judicial review was filed. Rat p. 302. Oral argument was 
heard on August 19, 2014 and the District Court upheld the hearing officer's decision. Rat p. 485. 
1 "Ewing did not raise an objection to the extension prior to the hearing on April I 0, 2014.'' 
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V. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. The SOP Has No Force or Effect in Law 
A. The Standard Operating Procedures for Breath Alcohol Testing Issued by the 
ISP Lack the Force and Effect of Law. 
B. There Is No Evidence The Idaho State Police Engaged In Proper Rulemaking 
Procedure In Compliance With IDAPA When It Issued The Standard 
Operating Procedures For Breath Alcohol Testing. 
II. There Is No Procedural or Substantive Due Process in ALS Hearings 
III. The Actions of the Hearing Officer Violate Mr. Ewing's Equal Protection Rights. 
IV. Violation OfI.C. §18-8002A(7): Exhibit 2 Is Insufficient To Show A Valid Breath 
Test Since There Is No Evidence That The Performance Verification Was Performed 
Within 24 Hours Of Testing As Required By The ISP Standard Operating Procedures 
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VI. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE SOP HAS NO FORCE OR EFFECT IN LAW 
The District Court, in analyzing the issue of ISP Forensic Services, and the Standard 
Operating Procedures found as the first issue: '·Whether the Standard Operating Procedures 
promulgated by the ISP have force and effect." R at p. 488. At no time did the District Judge 
answer that question in his decision. The District Court Judge states: ''The petitioner does not 
contest the accuracy of the test results or introduce any evidence regarding the circumstances of 
calibration, approval, certification or quality control performed by a laboratory operated by ISP." R 
at p. 488. This sentence makes no sense with regard to a breath test because a "laboratory" is not 
involved in a breath test. A laboratory only deals with testing of blood or urine. See IDAPA 
11.03.01.010.16 and now 11.03.01.013.01. Judge Gaskill then went on to cite LC. § l 8-8002A(3). 
He then stated: "Thus, ISP may prescribe by Rule what testing is required to complete evidentiary 
testing under this section, and what calibration or checking of the equipment must be performed to 
comply with the Department's requirements. If the breath testing instrument was approved for 
testing by the ISP, then the resulting evidentiary test for breath alcohol is valid for purposes of an 
administrative license suspension.'' Rat p. 489. No case, statute or rules states that if a breath 
testing instrument was approved for testing that the evidentiary breath test result from said machine 
would be valid for purposes of administrative license suspension. There is much more before a 
breath test can be used for evidence. The District Judge obviously didn't bother to read any of the 
case law cited by either the State or Mr. Ewing because his statement makes no sense. The District 
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Court then went on to note: 
"ISP have adopted rules governing alcohol testing, IDAPA 11.03.01.001 through 
11.03.01 .014. Consistent with its rules, ISP has determined the circumstances of the 
breath test considered by the hearing officer for purposes of administrative license 
suspension. IDAPA 11.03.01.014.03 sets forth the administration of breath test: 
Breath tests shall be administered in conformity with the standards adopted by the 
Department. Standard shall be developed for each type of breath testing instrument 
used in Idaho, and as such standards shall be issued in the form of analytical methods 
and standard operating procedures." 
Rat p. 489. 
With this statement, the District Court seems to have completely ignored State v. Swenson, 
156 Idaho 633,329 P.3d 1081 (Ct. App. 2014). The Court of Appeals has already determined that 
the SOP is not a rule, not a standard and that IDAPA Rule 11.03.01.004.03 is not sufficient 
compliance with I.C. § l 8-8004A(3 )2. The District Judge's decision is contrary to the decisions of 
the Court of Appeals in State v. Bescnv, 155 Idaho 134, 306 P .3d 219 ( Ct. App. 2013) and Platz v. 
State, 154 Idaho 960,303 P.3d 647 (Ct. App. 2013). 
The District Judge in Mr. Ewing's case went on to cite State v. Besaw, supra, stating that the 
Court of Appeals considered a similar argument. In State v. Bescnr, the Court was confronted with 
several pages of e-mails and an argument \Vas made about the lack of compliance with the statutory 
scheme. However, in Mr. Ewing's case, and in Mr. Hem's case, and in other cases before the 
2 ·'Although the ISP has adopted administrative "Rules Governing Alcohol Testing," see Idaho Administrative Code 
(IDAPA) 11.03 .0 I, et seq., its standards for evidentiary testing and calibration of equipment are not presented in the body 
of those administrative rules. 
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Appellate Courts from the First District3, the issue involves the lack of rulemaking. The District 
Court stated: "The Court is not persuaded that the SOPs are invalid because they are not promulgated 
as rules pursuant to the Idaho Administrative Rules Procedure Act." Rat p. 492. He cites to no case 
law to support this decision. The District Court's decision is really one conclusion after another with 
no supporting facts or cases. The District Judge just boiled his decision down to Mr. Ewing not 
showing that the breath test result wasn't valid. This is not the burden of the driver under LC. § 18-
8002A or LC. § 67-5279(3). To meet this burden a driver would have to be allowed much more 
discovery and much more time. 
No breath testing result can come in under the statutory scheme provided by the legislature 
unless there is valid rulemaking. Without valid rulemaking, the State would have had to produced 
an expert to uphold the process used by ISP in this case. The Court can be directed to two cases 
dealing \Vith the force and effect oflaw of agency regulations, Mead v. Arnell, 117 Idaho 666 ( 1990) 
and Asarco, Inc. v. State, 138 Idaho 719 (2003). 
State of Idaho v. Riendeau, Supreme Court Case No. 41982, Kootenai County Case No. CR 
13-0005363 and State v. Haynes, Supreme Court Case No. 41924, Kootenai County Case No. CR 
13-0003541 are both on appeal to the Supreme Court. The attorneys for the drivers argue that the 
Court of Appeals in Besaw improperly overturned the standard found in State v. Bell, 115 Idaho 36 
(Ct. App. 1988) by changing the requirement for a breath testing method from "highly reliable" to 
3 State of Idaho v. Riendeau, Supreme Cou11 Case No. 41982, Kootenai County Case No. CR 13-0005363 and State v. 
Haynes, Supreme Court Case No. 41924, Kootenai County Case No. CR 13-0003541. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 7 
"capable of providing an accurate result".· 
The Standard Operating Procedures for alcohol breath testing promulgated by the Idaho State 
Police easily fits into the definition of a "Rule" found in Arasco, Inc. v. State, supra. One would 
think that the method required by the legislature's adoption of LC. § l 8-8002A(3) and LC. § 18-
8004( 4) was intended by the legislature to act as a gate keeping function for the introduction of 
breath test results for cases dealing with alcohol testing, either in the DUI or in an ALS matter. See 
State v. Bell, 115 ID 36 (Ct. App. 1988). 
Idaho Appellate Court's have determined that where the standard or method is not complied 
with by the operator at the time of breath testing, an expert may be called to establish reliability. 
However, where no method exists at all, such as in Mr. Ewing's case, reliability cannot be 
established. See State v. Healy, 151 Idaho 734 (Ct. App.2011 ), State v. Charan, 132 Idaho 341, 971 
P .2d 1165 (Ct. App. 1998). In Searcy v. State, January 4, 2015, Decision, Docket No. 41216, the 
Court of Appeals had to deal with an issue of summary judgment regarding the assessment of fees 
by coITectional institutions. 
Attached as Exhibit 1 is a copy of the House Bill 284 in which the legislature chose to add 
what is now subsection 3 of I. C. § 18-8002A. The legislature noted the reason for the amendment: 
·'To provide rulemaking authority of the Department of Law Enforcement ... " The legislature 
generated a specific and entirely new subsection 3 to I.C. § l 8-8002A. In this new subsection 3 the 
legislature added rulemaking pursuant to Chapter 52, Title 67, Idaho Code. 
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The Court in Ewing also fails to note LC. § l 8-8002A(l 0): "Rules, the Department may adopt 
rules under the provisions of Chapter 52, Title 64, Idaho Code, deemed necessary to implement the 
provisions of this section." The legislature uses the word "may". The Court can go to ID APA Rule 
39.02.72.000: Legal Authority: "In accordance with § l 8-8002A, Idaho Code, the Idaho 
Transportation Board adopts the following rule governing administrative license suspension (ALS).'' 
The Court can compare what ISPFS did with their rulemaking in IDAP A Rule 11.03.01.000: 
Legal Authority: "The director of the Idaho State Police has general rulemaking authority to 
prescribe rules and regulations for alcohol testing, pursuant to §67-2901, Idaho Code." This ID APA 
rule does not cite to J.C. § l 8-8002A(3) regarding it's legal authority. The legislature made a specific 
requirement under § l 8-8002A(3) for rulemaking. ISPFS uses another code section of the Idaho 
Code that isn't specific to breath testing to try to circumvent the legislature's directive. ISPFS has 
played the Courts and the people of the State ofidaho is in violation ofl.C. §67-5279(3).4 Clearly 
this failure to comply with the directive of the legislature in § l 8-8002A(3) with regard to breath 
testing is in violation of both constitutional and statutory provisions and is in excess of the statutory 
authority ofISP. Using §67-2901 for rulemaking was made upon an unlawful procedure and isn't 
supported by substantial evidence on the record. Failing to comply with § l 8-8002A(3) was 
arbitrary, capricious, and an abusive discretion. 
4 67-5279. SCOPE OF REVIEW -- TYPE OF RELIEF ... (3) When the agency was required by the provisions of this chapter or by 
other provisions of law to issue an order, the court shall affirm the agency action unless the court finds that the agency's findings, 
inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) in excess of the statutory authority 
of the agency; (c) made upon unlawful procedure; (d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or (e) arbitrary, 
capricious, or an abuse of discretion. If the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or in part, and remanded for 
further proceedings as necessary. 
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Analysis of statutory construction of I.C. § l 8-8002A(3) can begin with cases from the 1930s. 
·'Ejusdem Generis must be considered in connection with the rule of construction in that effect must 
be given to all of the words of the statute if possible, so that none will be void, superfluous or 
redundant". In the Matter l?/ Winston Lumber Company, 57 Idaho 131, 136, 63 P.2d 664 (1936). 
The objective of the legislature with regard to the modification of l 8-8002A(3) was to 
require the Department of Law Enforcement and now ISPFS, to comply with the rulemaking 
requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act. There can be no other explanation for the 
addition of§ l 8-8002A(3). The Hern and Ewing decisions circumvent this point by failing to look 
at the entire statute and the purpose behind the statute or the case law dealing with statutory 
construction. In State v. Bunting Tractor Company, 58 Idaho 617, 77 P .2d 464 (193 8); in a decision 
written by Justice Ailshie, in which Justice Holden, Justice Givens and Justice Stevens, concurred, 
the Court in interpreting the use of the word ·'may" in the first sentence of the statute stated: " ... 
and although the word "may" was used in the first sentence, the word "shall" is used throughout the 
remained of the Act, and if it was not intended to be mandatory, it would render secs. 1510 and 1514 
fully meaningless and ineffectual." Justice Ailshie stated: "For these reasons, I am constrained to 
hold that sec. 65-1507 was intended to be mandatory and is to be read and construed in pari materia 
with sec. 1508.'' At p. 632. In other words, the Supreme Court determined that one has to read the 
whole statute, not one word, to give the statute its intended effect. 
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In State v. Nelson, 119 Idaho 444, 807 P.2d 1282 (Ct.App. 1991), the Court indicated that 
it was incumbent upon a court to give a statute an interpretation that will not render it a nullity. See 
also, Bonner County v. Cunningham, 323 P.3d 1252 (Idaho App. 2014) and Carlson v. Mullen, 29 
Idaho 795, 162 P.332 (1917). See State of Idaho v. Trusdall, 155 Idaho 965,318 P.3d 955 (Ct.Apps. 
2014). 
The Ewing decision is too simplistic in its analysis of§ l 8-8002A(3). It fails to take into 
account the very reason behind the rulemaking authority, to require science in breath testing. See 
State v. Bell, supra. 
Attached as Exhibits 3, 4, and 5 to the District Court Brief are letters sent to ISPFS regarding 
Freedom of Information Requests for information justifying the changes to the SOP. There is a 
March 20, 2013, letter to Major Wills (Exhibit 3). Rat p. 441. There is a letter to Matthew Garnette 
dated March 28, 2013 (Exhibit 4). Rat p. 443. There is a letter dated April 8, 2013, to Major Wills 
(Exhibit 5). R at p. 445. Responses to the March letters are found in the R at pp. 205-257. A 
response to the April 8, 2013, letter is also attached hereto at Exhibit 6 in which ISPFS noted: "No 
record found'' regarding any peer review, scientific literature, scientific testing or science behind the 
changes made in section 6 changing the word "must" to ·'should", in the new provisions that took 
effect on January 16, 2013, for the SOP. Rat p. 448. 
The Besaw Court, in its footnote number 5, stated: 
"If the breath testing standards had been promulgated as formal administrative rules 
pursuant to the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act, such avoidance of outsider 
comments would have been impossible, for that Act requires public notice and a 
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period for public comment, as well as legislative review, before adoption, 
amendment, or repeal of an administrative rule. See I.C. §§67-5220 to 67 -5224." 
Besmv at p. 229. 
The Court of Appeals has already determined that the SOP is not a rule, it is not a standard, 
and that IDAPA Rule 11.03.01.014.03 is not sufficient compliance with J.C. § l 8-8002A(3). State 
v. Swenson, 156 Idaho 633,329 P.3d 1081 (Ct. App. 2014). The SOP is not a rule, therefore, Mr. 
Ewing can raise the issue in this judicial review of his administrative license suspension. Mr. Ewing 
does not need to bring a declaratory judgment action naming ISPFS as a party. 
A. The Standard Operating Procedures for Breath Alcohol 
Testing Issued by the ISP Lack the Force and Effect of Law. 
"In practice rules and regulations have the same effect on people's daily lives as does 
statutory law. Both have the ability to greatly affect an individual's personal freedom 
and/or property. It makes little difference if the authority is a statute passed by the 
legislature or a regulation adopted by an administrative agency. The effect is the 
same." 
This statement by former Speaker of the Idaho House of Representatives and current U.S. 
Congressman Michael Simpson underscores the pervasiveness of administrative rules in the lives 
ofldahoans and the serious nature of rulemaking. Because of this, as was stated in the 2009 edition 
of The Idaho Rule Writer's Manual, the rulemaking process in Idaho "aims to involve all persons 
affected by state agency administrative rules and make transparent the regulatory process through 
which our statutory laws are implemented and [how] the practice and procedure requirements of our 
governmental agencies are established. C.L. "Butch" Otter, Mike Gwartney, & Dennis R. Stevenson, 
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The Idaho Rule Writer's Manual: A Guide for Drafting and Promulgating Administrative Rules in 
the State of Idaho, ( 2009)( emphasis added). 
The Idaho Administrative Procedure Act (IAPA), codified at Title 67, Chapter 52, Idaho 
Code, governs rulcmaking in Idaho. The Idaho Administrative Procedure Act (hereinafter "IAPA") 
defines rulemaking as the process for the formulation, adoption, amendment, or repeal of a rule. 
Idaho Code§ 67-5201(20). Through rulemaking an agency interprets, prescribes, and implements 
statutory law. Id. It also clarifies, standardizes, or establishes the agency's procedure or practice 
requirements. Id. All of this rulemaking is done under authority granted to the agency by the Idaho 
Legislature through its passing of an enabling statute. As such, rules may be promulgated by an 
agency only when specifically authorized by statute. J.C. § 67-5231 (1 ). Collectively, this is an 
agency's ability to make "law" under powers granted by the Legislature through statute. 5 All rules 
promulgated within the authority conferred by statute and in accordance with the IAP A, have the full 
force and effect oflaw and must be regarded as such. Higginson v. Westergard, 100 Idaho 687,690, 
604 P .2d 51, 54 (1979). As such, just as a law would be overturned by the courts, a rule is invalid 
if ( 1) is was not promulgated in substantial compliance with the procedural requirements of the 
IAPA, (2) does not meet legislative intent, or (3) exceeds or is outside the agency's substantive 
rulemaking or statutory authority. I.C. § 67-5279(3), Bennett v. S'tate, Dept. <~/Tramp., 147 Idaho 
141,206 P.3d 505 (Ct. App. 2009). 
5 
An agency also has the ability to make '"law" under powers granted by the Idaho Constitution in that agency rulcmaking grants no authority not 
already conferred by statute or the Constitution. 
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A court may overturn an agency's decision where its findings, inferences, conclusions, or 
decisions: ( a) violate statutory or constitutional provisions; (b) exceed the agency's statutory 
authority; ( c) are made upon unlawful procedure; ( d) are not supported by substantial evidence in 
the record; or (e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. I.C. § 67-5279(3), Cooper v. 
Board of Professional Discipline(~( Idaho State Bd of Medicine, 134 Idaho 44, 94 P.3d 561 (2000). 
The administrative license suspension statute (hereinafter "ALS"), I.C. § l 8-8002A, requires that 
the Idaho Transportation Department suspend the driver's license of a driver who has failed a BAC 
test administered by a law enforcement officer. Wilkinson v. State Dept. of Tran5p, 151 Idaho 784, 
264 P .3d 680 ( Ct. App.2011 ). The ALS hearing officer must uphold the suspension unless he or she 
finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the driver has shown one of several grounds 
enumerated in I.C. § 18-8002A(7) for vacating the suspension. Id. One of the five enumerated 
grounds for vacating the suspension is "the tests for alcohol concentration, drugs or other 
intoxicating substances administered at the direction of the peace officer were not conducted in 
accordance with the requirements of section 18-8004( 4), Idaho Code." I.C. § 18-8002A(7)(d). 
Idaho Code § 18-8004( 4) provides that tests to determine alcohol concentration of blood, urine, or 
breath must be performed in facilities or by methods approved by the Idaho State Police and in 
compliance with standards set by the State Police. Mahurin v. State Dep 't ofTramp., 140 Idaho 656, 
658, 99 P.3d 125, 127 (Ct.App.2004). To carry out the authority conferred by that statute, the State 
Police issued standard operating procedure manuals (herein after ·'SOPs'') establishing procedures 
for the maintenance and operation of breath test equipment. See IDAHO ADMIN. CODE 
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11.03.01.014. However, the SOPs are invalid as rules, and therefore, the ITD action resting on the 
SOPs must be set aside. 
The SOPs are invalid as rules because they were not promulgated in accordance with the 
rulemaking procedures of the IAP A. The Idaho legislature expressly authorized rules on "what 
calibration or checking of testing equipment must be performed ... " I.C. § 18-8002A(3)(b). But 
the legislature also required those rules to be promulgated "pursuant to Chapter 52, title 67, Idaho 
Code" i.e., the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act. Id. The IAPA defines a rule, in relevant part, 
as an agency statement "that has been promulgated in compliance with" its requirements. LC. § 67-
5201 ( 19). In the absence of such compliance, the SOPs are not rules and therefore lack the force and 
effect of law. They cannot be the basis for an agency or the court to determine legal rights or 
liabilities. Therefore, because the standard operating procedures for breath alcohol testing are invalid 
for failure to follow proper rulemaking procedures under the IAPA, any agency action, like an ALS 
Decision, resting on the SOP must be set aside. 
If the ISP desires to adopt a "statement ... that ... prescribes ... law," it must comply with the 
IAPA's rulemaking procedures. Michael S. Gilmore & Dale D. Goble, The Idaho Administrative 
Procedure Act: A Primer For The Practitioner, 30 Idaho L. Rev. 273 (1994). If the agency has not 
complied with these requirements, it has not promulgated a 'rule' and the statement lacks the force 
and effect of law. Id citing § 67-5201, cmt. 16. If an agency wishes to impose legal obligations on 
a class of persons, it must promulgate a rule. Id., see also Service Employees Int'! Union v. Idaho 
Dep'UdHealth & Welfare, I 06 Idaho 756, 758-59, 683 P.2d404, 406-07 (l 984)(agencymanual that 
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had not been promulgated as a rule did not create legal rights or responsibilities). It is readily 
apparent through the lack of a rulemaking record, lack of publication in the Bulletin, and lack of 
public input that the ISP acted without first promulgating a rule when it issued the ever-changing 
SOPs. This is problematic because the ISP, ALS hearing officers and Idaho courts use the SOPs as 
if they are rules. See State v. Besaw, 155 Idaho 134,306 P.3d 219 (Ct. App. 2013) (wherein the 
Court states, "We have treated those documents [Standard Operating Procedures for breath testing] 
as "rules" for purposes of judicial review because the parties have done so and because they 
constitute the only material by which the ISP has purpmied to authorize testing instruments and 
methods."); Platz v. S'tate, 154 Idaho 960,303 P.3d 647 (Ct. App. 2013) (''We have treated those 
documents as '·rules'· for purposes of judicial review because they constitute the only materials by 
which the ISP has acted upon the Idaho Code§ 18- 8002A(3) authorization for the ISP to "prescribe 
by rule." testing instruments and methods that are approved by the ISP, citing Hubbard v. 
Department o/Transportation, 152 Id. 879,276 P.3d 751 (Ct. App. 2012), and/n re Schroeder, 147 
Idaho 476,479 n. 3,210 P.3d 584,587 n. 3 (Ct.App.2009). To be fair, the Idaho courts do not limit 
its use ofSOPs as "rules" as applicable only to the detriment of defendants, because it has also used 
SOPs as "rules" against the ISP when it fails to follow the mandatory procedures contained in the 
SOPs. For example, in 2006 the Court of Appeals held that the ALS hearing officer must vacate a 
driver's license suspension when it was detem1ined that the ISP violated a mandatory provision 
contained in its SOP. Gihhar v. State olfdaho, Department ofTransportation, 143 Id. 937, 155 P.3d 
1176, (Ct. App. 2006); see also Mahurin v. State ofldaho, Department of'Transportation, 140 Id. 
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65, 99 P.3d 125, (2004)(stating noncompliance with these procedures [as contained in the ISP issued 
SOP for breath testing procedures] is a ground for vacating an administrative license suspension 
under LC. § l 8-8002A(7)( d)). Unfortunately, the ISP, ALS hearing officers and Idaho courts' use 
of the SOPs as "rules" is in error. Under Idaho law, in order to have the force and effect oflaw an 
agency action characterized as a rule must be promulgated according to statutory directives for 
rulemaking. See LC. § 67-5231 ( declaring rules invalid unless adopted in substantial compliance 
with the requirements of the IAPA); Asarco Inc. v. State, 2003, 69 P.3d 139, 138 Idaho 719 (2003) 
(stating agency action was a "rule," and thus had to be promulgated in accordance with 
Administrative Procedures Act to be valid.); Mead v. Arnell, 117 Idaho 660, 664, 791 P .2d 410, 414 
(1989) (holding rules promulgated by agency action have the force and effect of law). LC. § 
67-5201 et seq. Therefore, in the absence of evidence of substantial compliance with rulemaking 
procedures, this Court must decide that the SOPs are not "rules" and thus, do not have the full force 
and effect oflaw. If the SOP for breath alcohol testing does not have the full force and effect oflaw, 
it cannot be the basis for any agency action resting on the SOP. As a result of this any breath test 
result must be set aside. Thus there is no ability to suspend a license. 
B. There Is No Evidence The Idaho State Police Engaged In Proper 
Rulemaking Procedure In Compliance With IDAP A When It Issued The 
Standard Operating Procedures For Breath Alcohol Testing. 
The ISP did not engage in the formal rulemaking procedures of the IAPA when it issued its 
ever-changing SOPs. This is in direct conflict to the purpose for having formal rulemaking 
procedures. By requiring agency decision makers to comply with procedural norms of openness and 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 17 
rationality, the IAP A both creates procedural guarantees and limits agency discretion. Michael S. 
Gilmore & Dale D. Goble, The Idaho Administrative Procedure Act: A Primer For The Practitioner, 
30 Idaho L. Rev. 273 (1994). Moreover, the drafters of the IAPA also sought to implement broad 
policy goals such as opening up the administrative process to increased public participation and 
scrutiny and regularizing agency proceedings. Id. But, when an agency is engaged in rulemaking it 
is acting in a legislative capacity and the process constitutionally due does not include an 
individualized hearing. See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Ed of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 
( 1915 ). Because of this comparatively minimal due process requirement, the importance of statutory 
procedures and safeguards increases. These statutory procedures are contained in §§ LC. 67-5220 
to 67-5232. Idaho's administrative rulemaking process contains five stages: proposed, negotiated, 
temporary, pending, and final. The following is a description of the rulemaking process under the 
IAPA from the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality: First, proposed rulemaking is the stage 
in which the agency proposes to amend or repeal an existing rule or to adopt a new rule. Prior to the 
adoption, amendment, or repeal of a rule, the agency is required to publish a notice and the text of 
the proposed rule in the Idaho Administrative Bulletin. During this stage, the public is invited to 
submit comments to the agency. Second, negotiated rulemaking is an optional process in which all 
interested parties and the agency seek a consensus on the content of a rule. Agencies are encouraged 
to proceed through this informal stage whenever feasible. This stage is initiated with the publication 
of a Notice of Negotiated Rulemaking in the Idaho Administrative Bulletin. This process leads to 
the proposed and/or temporary rulemaking stages. Temporary rulemaking is third. If the Governor 
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finds that temporary adoption of a rule (a) protects the public health, safety, or welfare; (b) complies 
with deadlines in amendments to governing law or federal programs; or ( c) confers a benefit, the . 
agency may proceed with temporary rulemaking. A temporary rule may become effective 
immediately upon adoption and expires upon conclusion of the next succeeding regular legislative 
session unless extended by concurrent resolution. Once the temporary rule is adopted, the agency is 
required to publish a notice and the text of the temporary rule in the Idaho Administrative Bulletin. 
If the text of the temporary rule is the same as that of the proposed rule, the rulemaking can be 
combined and published in the Idaho Administrative Bulletin as a temporary/proposed rule. Next, 
a pending rule is a rule that has been adopted by an agency under the regular rulemaking process and 
remains subject to legislative review before becoming final and effective. Once the pending rule is 
adopted, the agency is required to publish a notice of pending rule in the Idaho Administrative 
Bulletin. ff the rule varies in content from that which was initially proposed, the pending rule also 
must be printed in the Idaho Administrative Bulletin. A pending rule must be submitted to the 
legislature for review before it can become final and effective. Finally, and unless specified 
otherwise, a pending rule that has been submitted for review and approved by the legislature will 
become final and effective upon conclusion of that legislative session. Final rules are annually 
codified in the Idaho Administrative Code. 
As applied to the standard operating procedures, there is absolutely no evidence to suggest 
that the ISP was in compliance with any of the steps above to even remotely show that it followed 
the IAPA to properly promulgate the SOPs as "rules." In fact, quite the opposite is true. 
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Not only has the ISP not followed the proper rulemaking procedure of the IAP A when issuing 
SOPs, it actually takes a very laid-back and painfully informal approach to creating SOPs. Because 
ISP did not engage in the formal rulemaking procedures under the IAPA, the SOPs are merely 
guidelines and do not have the full force and effect oflaw to the extent an agency decision can rest 
upon them. 
To be clear, and by its own reference, the issuing authority of the breath alcohol testing SOP 
is the "ISPFS Quality Manager," recognized to stand for Idaho State Police Forensic Science Quality 
Manager. See Idaho State Police Forensic Services, 6.0 Idaho Breath Alcohol Standard Operating 
Procedure Breath Alcohol Testing, Revision 5, 08/2013. But, the ISPFS is part of the Idaho State 
Police, insomuch as its actions amount to actions by the ISP. The Forensic Section did not begin as 
part of the State Police department, but officially became part of the Idaho State Police in 1999 when 
the Bureau of Forensic Services became ISP Forensic Services.6 So while the ISPFS is the" issuing 
authority" of the breath testing SOP, because it is part of the ISP, it too must follow the proper 
rulemaking procedure of the IAPA when issuing SOPs. 
"6.0 Idaho Standard Operating Procedure Breath Alcohol Testing, Revision 5, Effective 
8/20/2013" is the most current version of the Idaho State Police's SOP for breath alcohol testing. 
This is the second "new edition" in the year 2013, with Revision 4 taking effect a mere 7 months 
6 Sli!i IDAHO STATE POLICE, History of ISP Forensics, available at http://www.isp.idaho.gov/forcnsics/indcx.htrnl "The forcn,ics unit had its 
beginnings in 1 %3 when the Division of l.ahoralurics in the I kpartment of I kalth established an analytical unit for the analysis of blood and hn:ath 
alcohol for the Idaho State Police. The 1:orcnsic Section 11as transferred to the Dcpartrncnl of Law L11forcc1111:nt from the Bureau of Laboratories in 
1hc lkpanmcnt off k,ilth and \Vcl for,: .July I. I 988. The name of the Department changed to ldahu Stak J'l)!i--C July I, 1999 and the Bureau of 
1:orrnsic Services hccw111: ISP l·orcmic Services." 
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prior to the latest edition. 7 Additionally, while the year 2012 saw only one revision 8, Revision 3, the 
year 2010 saw three different editions of this SOP.9 If the discussion stopped right there, it is 
patently obvious that these SOPs are readily changed and revised with relative ease and in a fast, and 
likely cost-effective, manner. This is in contrast to the typical timeline for rulemaking when 
following the proper rulemaking procedures under the IAP A That timeline consists of months, but 
is understandable how formal rulemaking would take longer, because it are these formal procedural 
safeguards that prevent the arbitrary and on a whim changes that are seen in the current way the 
SOPs are created. Nevertheless, this discussion continues. 
Even though the ISP approach to issuing the SOPs is painfully informal, we recognize it 
would be helpful to the Court to have an outline of what procedure the ISP does follow when it 
wishes to change, revise or implement an SOP. Unfortunately, the ISP's approach is so painfully 
informal, that there doesn't appear to be much in the way of a record from which an outline can be 
created. What we do know is that the SOPs are frequently revised. Further the 2009 SOP was nine 
pages long and the first SOP of 2010 was 17 pages long - see Exhibit 2 attached hereto. But, we 
have no information about who determined what changes would be made and/or why. Additionally, 
and over the years, there appears to be significant changes with regard to the word ·'must." Many 
instances of the word "must" in earlier editions of the SOP was evidently changed to "should." For 
7 
SFF IDAHO STATE POLICE FORENSIC SERVICES, 6.0 Idaho Breath Alcohol Standard Operating Procedure Breath Alcohol Testing, Revision 
5.08/20!3, page 5. 
BID. 
9 In. 
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example. In the 2009 SOP, section 6.1 stated: "Prior to evidentiary breath alcohol testing, the 
subject/individual must be monitored for at least fifteen (15) minute." ( emphasis added) Compare 
this to the SOP dated November 1, 2010, wherein section 6.1 stated: "Prior to evidentiary breath 
alcohol testing, the subject/individual should be monitored for at least fifteen (15) minutes." 
(emphasis added) From the documents obtained under the Freedom oflnformation Act, it appears 
that concerns, revisions, and most discussions regarding the SOPs occur over e-mail. 
Jeremy Johnston in an email to prosecutors and others, which is dated December 19, 2012, 
stated: "I have made some changes to the SOP due to rulings, suggestions and need for 
clarifications. Please review this and see if there needs to more or less added.'' Rat p. 230. The 
court can review the emails generated just prior to the introduction of the SOP on January 16, 2013. 
Rat pp. 205-257. These emails represent the reasons for the change of the SOP from the one dated 
April 23, 2012. No science is noted to justify the changes. No science is noted to justify the changes 
from "must" to "should" in the SOP. There is no indication in the emails that the machines have 
changed and there is no explanation as to why 30 years of mandatory language has been replaced 
with discretionary language. 
On May 11, 2012, just a few days after the SOP was modified in April, Jeremy Johnston 
sends the following email to one "kmumford@kcgovus": "What was the wording you wanted for 
the SOP change that we had talked about a few weeks back? I'm having a conference call next week 
about the changes and wanted to get the wording right in there so it works for all sides". R. at p. 228. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 22 
What science justifies the changes to the SOP so often? See SOP History Page, R. at p. 211. There 
is no science. 
Please note that the Idaho Supreme Court has determined an agency action is capricious if 
it was done without a rational basis. In American Law Association of Idaho/Nevada v. State, 142 
Id. 544, 130 P.3d 1082 (2006), the Court found it was arbitrary if the agency action was done in 
disregard of the facts and circumstances presented or without adequate determining principles. What 
was the rational basis for making the SOP a discretionary document? There was a disregard of 
scientific principles, facts and circumstances making the current SOP arbitrary. 
The e-mails noted in this case make it clear that ISPFS failed to comply with the mandate of 
J.C. § 18-8004( 4) and LC.section 18-8002A. 
states: 
There is a specific e-mail from Darren Jewkes to several employees of the ISPFS. Mr. Jewkes 
"I am not sure if I dare ask, but are there any other parts of the SOP that you 
feel needs immediate attention, such as changing "will" to "may" or 
"approximately" or doing away with "monthly" etc. (Jeremy here is your 
chance:)." (emphasis added) 
R. at p. 111 
It is interesting to note that in this e-mail, Darren Jewkes actually uses the":)" symbol. 
The legislature passed LC. § 18-8004( 4) requiring valid methods of breath testing. ISPFS 
has made rules that weaken the breath testing standards so much that basically if the police get a 
result, it is admissible. Therefore, ISPFS has taken this delegation of authority to an unconstitutional 
level. 
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This should be a discussion of improvements to the scientific methods, not improvements 
to the methods to withstand legal challenges. In support of this, the Court can note that there is very 
little science discussed in the e-mails with regards to changes to the SOPs. This is concerning 
because the procedures used to test and the operation of the breath test machines are very scientific 
in nature and require adherence that facilitates proper use so as to provide a reliable result. Even the 
Court of Appeals recognized the importance of a reliable result in that "the purpose of [LC.] 18-
8002, is to provide an incentive for motorists to cooperate in determining levels of blood-alcohol 
content by a reasonably precise scientific method." ( emphasis added). State v. Breed, 111 Idaho 497, 
725 P.2d 202 (Ct. App. 1986). Moreover, the reason the legislature has allowed the expedited 
introduction of breath test results in DUis and ALS matters is because of the guarantee of science. 
See State v. Bell, 115 Idaho 36, 764 P.2d 113 (Ct. App. 1988), State v. Phillips, 117 Idaho 609, 790 
P.2d 390 (Ct. App. 1990). 
Wherein the Court of Appeal's in State v. Besmv, 155 Idaho 134, 306 P.3d 219 (Ct. App. 
2013), stated in a footnote, "We have not, however, held that these SOPs and manuals actually 
constitute 'rules' or that ISP has 'prescribed by rule' testing instruments and methods as 
contemplated by Idaho Code 18-8002A(3); that issue has never been presented to this court," this 
Court is. As Mr. Bramble-Smollett cried in Humphry Clinker, "there is no time like the present." 
With this question now presented to this Court, it's time for a determination of the status of the 
SOPs. By its own account, the ISPFS indicates that the coming years "will see ISP Forensic Services 
continue to contribute fair and impartial scientific analysis to the criminal justice system. [ And] 
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Incorporation ofimproved analytical methods and continuing quality assurance programs will assure 
the perpetuation of high standards currently maintained by the unit. 10" It is clear, through its 
painfully informal process ofcreating and modifying the standard operating procedures that the ISP 
needs guidance from this court to help facilitate it's goals of "contributing fair and impaiiial 
scientific analysis" and "incorporating improved analytical methods and continuing quality assurance 
programs" so that it may effectively perpetuate the high standards it currently maintains. 
Ultimately, the SOP for breath testing procedure cannot be characterized as "rules" because 
they were not promulgated in compliance with the formal rulemaking procedures of the IAP A, and 
as such, do not have the full force and effect oflaw. However, if this Court decides the SOPs are 
in fact "rules," as they are so treated by Idaho courts, ALS hearing officers and the ISP, this Court 
must contemporaneously find that the SOPs for breath alcohol testing are invalid for failing to 
substantially comply with the with the procedural requirements of the IAPA. And again, an invalid 
"rule" does not have the fi.111 force and effect of lavv. It is clear, then, that regardless of whether or 
not this Court determines the SOP to be a "rule" or not, the SOP for breath alcohol testing does not 
have the full force and effect oflaw and it cannot be the basis for an agency or the court to determine 
legal rights or liabilities. Therefore, any agency action resting on the SOP for breath alcohol testing 
must be set aside. 
10 Sm: IDAHO STATE POLICE, History of ISP Forensics, available at http://www.isp.idaho.gov/frJrcnsics/indcx.html. 
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II. THERE IS NO PROCEDURAL OR 
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS IN ALS HEARINGS 
The District Court in its decision regarding due process stated: "While it is clear that the 
petitioner was not afforded a hearing within twenty (20) days, the matter was still heard within the 
thirty (30) day time frame as contemplated by Idaho Code § 18-8002A." The Court continues: "It 
appears that Ewing is asserting that the hearing officer arbitrarily extended the date of the hearing 
in this case." Rat p. 494. The Court then ,.vent on to cite Bell v. Idaho Transportation Department, 
151 Idaho 659 (2011 ). The quote was substantial but important parts of said quote relevant to this 
issue are as follows: "However, an undue delay in holding a post suspension hearing or issuing a 
decision may constitute a deprivation of due process. (cites omitted)." Bell at 670. Rat p. 494. 
The U.S. Supreme Court indicated in Dixon v. Love, 431U.S.105, 97 S.Ct. 1723, 52 L.Ed.2d 
172, ( 1977) that:: 
The State will not be able to make a driver whole for any personal inconvenience and 
economic hardship suffered by reason of any delay is redressing an erroneously 
suspension through post suspension review procedures. ( emphasis added) 431 US at 
113; 97 S. Ct. at 1728. 
In Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 11, 99 S.Ct. 2612, 2617, 61 L.Ed.2d 321 (1979), the post 
suspension hearing was available immediately upon a driver's suspension and may have been 
initiated by him simply by walking into the local registrar's office and requesting a hearing. The 
statute in Dixon in contrast, did not mandate that a date be set for a post suspension hearing until 
twenty (20) days after a written request for such a hearing was received from the affected driver. 
Dixon v. Love at 109-110, 97 S. Ct. at 726. 
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The District Judge then states: "The record before the Court does not support the petitioner's 
argument that his substantive and due process rights were violated." Rat p. 494. The District Court 
does not address whether the hearing officer arbitrarily extended the date of the hearing in this case. 
The decision of the hearing officer was not reached until May 12, 2014. Rat p. 15. 
The District Court does not seem to have any concern that hearing officer based his decision 
on a faulty understanding of the record. The hearing officer said that Counsel did not raise an 
objection to the hearing date, but Counsel did raise an objection which is specifically found on this 
record. Rat p. 94. The hearing officer specifically noted: "Ewing did not raise an objection to the 
extension prior to the hearing on April 10, 2014." Rat p. 14. However, in the same decision, the 
hearing notes that the petitioner supplemented the record with the following exhibits: "Objection to 
Show Cause Hearing". Rat p. 8. Of course there was no show cause hearing because the hearing 
officer didn't allow one. The hearing officer did not issue his ALS decision before Mr. Ewing's 
license suspension started so Mr. Ewing's attorney had to take the extraordinary measure of 
requesting a stay of the license suspension. Rat p. 258. The hearing officer issued a stay on April 
16, 2014. For one (1) day, Mr. Ewing was without his driving privileges. The State cannot return 
that day to Mr. Ewing. The District Court didn't seem to care about the fact that the hearing officer 
issued a show cause letter without any sort of hearing or concern regarding the fact that the hearing 
officer is the one who caused the delay, not Mr. Ewing. The District Court did not seem concerned 
that the hearing officer did not know the state of his record when he issued his decision. The District 
Court did not seem to be concerned about the fact that the hearing officer didn't seem to know when 
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subpoenas were being issued. In fact, the hearing officers probably do not issue the subpoenas, a 
staff member with a signature stamp does. See Idaho Code§ 18-8002A(l)(f) forduries of the hearing 
officers. The hearing officer cannot relegate the duty of issuing subpoenas to someone else with the 
use of a stamp. 
The hearing officer's analysis of this issue is hard to understand as he seems to be blaming 
the Court of Appeals for its decision in Bell v. !TD. Rat p. 14. Based on a hearing request being 
made on March 18, 2014, a hearing should have been held on or before April 7, 2014. Instead, the 
hearing officer noted that a hearing would be held on April 10, 2014. In this case, the hearing officer 
does not explain why all of his orders and subpoenas were issued on March 24, 2014, which is six 
(6) days after the Request for Hearing was received by the Department. The Department sets up 
failure for due process by withholding subpoenas and the like. The information from the arresting 
officer was sent to the Department on March 19, 2014. Rat p. 32 (note the date stamp at the bottom 
right hand corner of some parts of the record). 
Case law allows a driver's license to be suspended prior to a due process hearing. The 
reasons were set out in a series of United States Supreme Court cases. In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 
645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, (1977), the U.S. Supreme Court stated: 
"This court has not, however, embraced the general proposition that a wrong may be 
done if it can be undone. Cf. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of'Bayvieiv, 395 
U.S. 337, 89 S.Ct. 1820, 23 L.Ed.2d 349, (1969). Surely, in this case before us, if 
there is a delay between the doing and the undoing petitioner suffors from the 
deprivation of his children, and the children suffer from the uncertainty and 
dislocated." 
At p. 647. 
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In Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971), the Court stated once 
licenses are issued, ... their continued possession may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood. 
Suspension of issued licenses .. .involves state action that adjudicates important interests of the 
licensee. In such cases the licenses are not to be taken away without that procedural due process 
required by the Fourteenth Amendment. At p. 539. The fundamental requirement of due process 
is the opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Armstrong v. 
i\1anzo, 380 U.S. 545,552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 1191, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965). See also Grannis v. Ordean, 
234 U.S. 385,394, 34 S.Ct. 79, 783, 58 L.Ed. 1363 (1914) and .Mathews v. Eldridge, 42 U.S. at 33, 
96 S.Ct. at 902. As the U.S. Supreme Court recognized in Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 97 S.Ct. 
1723, 52 L.Ed.2d 172, (1977) the interest in a driver's license is a substantial one. The State will 
not be able to make a driver whole for any personal inconveniences and economic hardships suffered 
by reason of any delay in redressing an erroneous post suspension review procedure. 431 U.S. at 
131, 91 S.Ct. at 1728. The U.S. Supreme Court has found that procedural due process serves to 
ensure that the person threaten with loss has an opportunity to present his side of the story to a 
'·neutral decision maker" at a time when the deprivation can be prevented. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 
U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556, (1972). The ITD hearing officers cannot be considered 
neutral decision makers. Part of this record notes that ITD hearing officer Moody sent an e-mail to 
ISPFS regarding hearings he had held regarding the SOP that was put into effect on August 20,2010. 
R at p. 104. '·I hope these updates reinforce our ALS decisions.", is what Eric Moody wrote to 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 29 
ISPFS. Should a "neutral decision maker" be contacting ISPFS regarding problems with the SOP 
for breath testing because drivers' license suspensions are being vacated? 
In Bell v. Burson, supra, the Court deemed it fundamental that except in emergencies 
situations, the state must afford a hearing before a driver's license termination become effective. It 
is interesting to note that the U.S. Supreme Court, with regard to these sorts of issues, focuses on 
credibility and veracity. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 343-344, 96 S.Ct. at 907. The 
suspension itself effects the final deprivation of property that no subsequence proceeding can restore. 
See again Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, 424 U.S. at 340, 96 S.Ct. at 905. The court in Bell v. Burson, 
supra, made it quite clear that additional expense occasioned by expanding the hearing process is 
sufficient to withstand the constitutional requirement. While the problem ofadditional expense must 
be kept in mind, it does not justify denying a hearing meeting the ordinary standards of due process. 
At pp. 541-542. See also Bell v. !TD, 151 Idaho 659,262 P.3d. 1030 (2011). 
In this case, the hearing officer issued his subpoenas and the like on March 24th , 2014. On 
March 25, 2014, Counsel for Mr. Ewing submitted an objection to the scheduling of the hearing and 
the Show Cause letter. Rat pp. 95-95. The hearing officer obviously did not know the state of his 
record because in his Amended Findings and Conclusion he states as follows: "Ewing did not raise 
an objection to the extension prior to the hearing on April 10, 2014." Rat p. 14. At the hearing, 
held on April 10, 2014, Counsel specifically argued: " ... Even though in this case I asked for a 
hearing and I objected to the show cause because there wasn't anything on the record other than 
saying that you needed to make sure that the subpoenaed information got to where it needed to go." 
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Transcript at p. 5. Rat p. 337. The Court can look at what the Department calls its Show Cause 
Letter. It notes the reason for the hearing being scheduled as: "allow time for receipt of subpoenaed 
evidence requested by the Petitioner." Rat p. 262. By Mr. Carter's recitation during the hearing, one 
could assume that he is not aware of when these subpoenas and the like are being issued. Someone 
in the Department simply stamps his name and sends out subpoenas and orders. Counsel for Mr. 
Ewing tried to place Mr. Carter under oath as a witness to explain exactly why subpoenas are issued 
so many days after the request for hearing is made and to inquire as to why the show cause matter 
was heard without driver's counsel being involved. The argument to the hearing officer at the time 
of the hearing is incorporated by the reference so it does not have to be restated. The hearing officer 
indicated that the Hammish Bell decision is what drives the hearing officers to have hearings outside 
the statutory time frame. However, there is no explanation as to why subpoenas and the like aren't 
issued in a timely fashion other than the hearing officer making a vague reference to the volume of 
cases they are handling. Rat p. 343. 
Please note \Vhat Skip Carter said in response to the problem with waiting days to issue 
subpoenas: "I don't know if it is absolutely physically possible for them to immediately issue the 
subpoenas the way that you are describing." (Emphasis added) Rat p. 343. One wonders who the 
"them" might be since it was Skip Carter's name on the subpoenas. Rat pp. 86, 87, 88, 89. Skip 
Carter appears to have no knowledge of when things are subpoenaed, however, he must know that 
someone else is stamping his name. See LC. § 18-8002A(l )(f). Based on Mr. Carter's comments, 
even though they weren't under oath, you could assume that he is not aware of when the information 
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is being sent out. He is probably not aware of what information is being sent out. He certainly 
wasn't aware of the record and the objection to the show cause letter in this case. 
It is well established that the suspension of an issued motor vehicle operator's license 
involves State action that adjudicates important property interest of the licence. In such cases, the 
licenses or driving privileges are not to be taken away without the procedural due process rights 
required by the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 97 S.Ct. 
1723, 52 L.Ed.2d, 152 (1977); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 931 S.Ct. 1586, 29 L.Ed.2d, 90 (1971) 
and!llinoisv. Batchelder,463 U.S.1112, 103 S.Ct. 3513, 77L.Ed.2d, 12,66(1983). SeeStatev. 
Ankney, 109 Id. 1, 704 P.2d 333, (1985) and State v. Kouni, 58 Id. 493, 76 P.2d 917, (1938). 
The Court in Afatthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) 
determined whether an administrative proceeding satisfies due process. The first factor deals with 
the private interest that would be effected by the official action. The second involves the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used and the probable value, if any, 
ofadditional or substitute procedural safeguards. The final factor involves the government's interest 
including the function involved in the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or 
substitute procedure would entail. See Bell, supra. 
The Court In The Matter of Wilson, 128 ldaho 161, 167; 911 P.2d 754 (1996), simply stated: 
"Procedural due process requires that a party be provided at an opportunity to be heard at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner". See also Cootz v. State, 117 Idaho 38, 785 P.2d 163 
(1989). In Abrams v. Jones, 35 Idaho 532, 207 P.724 (1922), the Supreme Court stated: "Due 
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process oflaw is not necessarily satisfied by any process which legislature may by law provide, but 
by such process only it safeguards and protects the fundamental, constitutional rights of a citizen." 
At p. 546. See Pace v. Hymas, 111 Idaho 581, 726 P.2d 693 (1986). 
In a footnote, the Platz court goes back to cite its concern regarding pre-decision suspensions 
in Bell by stating: 
''Although Bell's repeated request for irrelevant discovery contributed somewhat to 
the hearing's postponement, the delays involved here are troubling to this court. The 
actions of the hearing officer evidences little regard for Bell's substantial interests in 
receiving the decision before, or at least promptly after, the deprivation of this 
license. Bell v. !TD, 151 Id. 659, 67L 262 P.3d 1030, 1040 (Ct. App. 2011)." 
At p. 661. 
In Bell v. Burson, supra, the lJ.S. Supreme Court noted that Georgia had several alternative 
methods of compliance. One involved Georgia electing to abandon its present scheme completely 
and pursue one of the various alternatives in force in other states. At p. 543. Georgia could also 
reject all of the above suggestion and devise an entirely new regulatory scheme. The fact is that ITD 
continues to delete sections of the IDA PA rules that benefit the driver such as the ID APA, Rule 
39.02.72.600. This rule required hearing officers to have decisions done within 30 days. The District 
Court can address these issues on review and send a message like the U.S. Supreme Court did in Bell 
v. Burson that the state should just take the several alternative methods of compliance available to 
it and bring the ALS system in compliance with due process. 
Please recall that ALS hearing officers can not make constitutional decisions based on the 
administrative statutes that apply to these administrative hearings. IDAPA Rule, 4.11.01.415. The 
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Court in Bell v. !TD, supra, failed to note this in its decision about the failure of the driver to raise 
this constitutional issue with the ITD hearing officer. See Bell at p. 671. 
Mr. Ewing has a interest in his driver's license that is quite substantial. The record in this 
case shows that there is a risk of erroneous deprivation of his driver's license through the current 
procedures used. Clearly, it would be easy enough to modify the procedure to note that the 
temporary license does not terminate until the hearing officer's decision is reached. The State of 
Washington uses this procedure. RCW §§ 46.25.125(6) and 46.20.308(8). The government's 
interest in changing this procedure is minimal and there is no administrative burden. In fact, 
extending the time frame for decisions and suspensions probably would be welcomed by the ALS 
hearing officers because they would have more time to issue decisions and not be overburdened with 
the few days they have from when the hearing is held until when the temporary license expires. 
There is no procedural or substantive due process in this ALS process. The factors found in 
Matthevvs v. Eldridge, 424 US 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.2d 18 (1976) and in Pace v. Humas, supra. 
are found in this case. 
III. THE ACTIONS OF THE HEARING OFFICER 
VIOLA TE MR. EWING'S EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS. 
The District Judge, with regard to the issue of equal protection, boiled it down to the 
following: The record in this case indicates that the petitioner's hearing was delayed for good cause 
shown pursuant to LC. § l 8-8002A(7). Rat p. 495. The Judge does not point out exactly what the 
good cause was on this record so it is hard for the Court on appeal to determine exactly what was 
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in the District Court's mind when it made this conclusionary statement. The District Court did not 
say that drivers who ask for subpoenas aren't being treated differently. In fact, one would assume 
from his lack of discussion on this issue, that the Judge actually determined that drivers who ask for 
subpoenas are treated differently. 
The District Court went on to state: "The Petitioner has not established that this delay 
resulted in a violation of Mr. Ewing's equal protection rights." Rat p. 495. Once again, Mr. Ewing 
did not get the benefit of the statutory requirement for a hearing within twenty (20) days. Mr Ewing 
was without his license for a day. His attorney had to spend additional time and Mr. Ewing's money 
requesting additional relief that certainly isn't contemplated by the statutory scheme. The Court has 
to decide what is '·good cause" for hearing officers to delay hearings. Clearly, the legislature knew 
that subpoenas would be issued and that hearings would be held within twenty (20) days. The 
District Judge dealing with the equal protection issues stated: "The record in this case indicates that 
the petitioner's hearing was delayed for good cause shown pursuant to LC. § 18-8002A(7)." Rat 
p. 495. The Court, in its opinion, never does specifically state what the good cause was for the delay 
in the hearing. One would have to assume that if there wasn't good cause for the delay in the hearing 
than there was a violation of Mr. Ewing's right. The District Court goes on to say: "The petitioner 
has not established that this delay resulted in a violation of his equal protection rights." Rat p. 495. 
The Court does no analysis of how different drivers are being treated. It is clear that Mr. Ewing was 
treated differently because he requested subpoenas. Because Mr. Ewing requested subpoenas he did 
not get the statutory time frame for having a timely post-suspension hearing. The hearing officer 
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blames the Court of Appeals for its decision in Hammish Bell for its current procedure. Mr. Ewing 
did not get the benefit of the legislative intent regarding having hearings in a timely manner to deal 
with his license suspension. In this case, Mr. Ewing's license was suspended before the hearing 
officer granted the stay. There is no explanation as to why a good cause hearing wasn't held 
considering the objection and request by Mr. Ewing's counsel. District Court's decision is not based 
on any analysis of the facts. The District Court just makes a conclusionary statement and moves on 
to the next issue. 
Mr. Ewing is being treated differently than drivers who don't ask for the hearing officer to 
issue subpoenas. As the court is aware, based upon the argument noted above, the hearing officer 
has a duty to issue subpoenas and gather relevant evidence. LC. § 18-8002A( 1 )(f). The hearing 
officer has a duty to have a hearing within 20 days of the receipt of the request for hearing from the 
driver. The hearing officer in Mr. Ewing's case choose to set the hearing after the 20 days mandated 
by the legislature because Mr. Ewing asked that subpoenas be issued for relevant evidence. The 
hearing officer specifically noted this as the cause for the extension to April 10, 2014. Rat p. 262. 
Under the rational basis test a classification will withstand an equal protection challenge if there is 
any conceivable state of facts that will support it. Meisner v. Potlatch Corp. 131 Id. 258, 954 P2d 
676, ( 1998). The equal protection clauses of the Idaho and federal constitutions embrace principles 
that all persons in like circumstances should receive the same benefit and burdens of the law. Here 
Mr. Ewing was treated differently for no reason, other than to punish him for taking the small 
advantage allowed him from the ALS statute regarding limited discovery. There is nothing in this 
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record that supports Mr. Ewing being treated differently than a driver who does not request limited 
discovery. Remember, Mr. Ewing has the burden of proof in this ALS matter. This burden is pretty 
difficult to meet without some of the "relevant evidence" the statute allows. Due process requires 
a liberty interest while equal protection does not. State v. Reed 107 Id. 162, 686 P2d 842 (Ct.App. 
1984). 
The Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the US Constitution is designed to 
assure that those persons similarly situated with respect to governmental action are treated alike. 
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 US 432, 439 (1985). The same protection is 
afforded under the Idaho Constitution. State v. Missamore, 119 Id. 27,33, 803 P2d 528, 534 (1990). 
Selective or discriminatory enforcement or application of a statute may amount to an equal 
protection violation under the state and federal constitutions if the challenger shows a deliberate plan 
of discrimination based on some unjustifiable classification. A "class of one" may state an equal 
protection claim if he or she was intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and 
the difference in treatment fails to satisfy the requisite level of scrutiny. Village of Willoivbrook v. 
Olech, 528 US 562, 564, (2000)(per curiam): Anderson v. Spalding, 137 Id 509, 514, 50 P3d 1004, 
1009 (2002). Mr. Ewing may be a class of one or there may be many more. Counsel for Mr. Ewing 
has had two other clients treated in the same manner, one lost his ALS the other won his ALS but 
still had to suffer the loss of his license for three or four days because the hearing was not held in a 
timely manner. If there is no equal protection violation, then the hearing officer has made this 
decision to treat Mr. Ewing differently in violation of LC. §67-5279(3). Either way, the decision to 
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set the hearing outside the mandatory 20 day period violated Mr. Ewing's rights and was not justified 
on this record. Mr. Ewing did not invite error by asking for the discovery allowed by LC. § 18-
8002A. The court should set aside the hearing officer's decision and remand to the Department with 
an order to set aside the license suspension. 
IV. VIOLATION OF I.C. §18-8002A(7): 
EXHIBIT 2 IS INSUFFICIENT TO SHOW AV ALID BREA TH TEST SINCE 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE PERFORMANCE VERIFICATION 
WAS PERFORMED WITHIN 24 HOURS OF TESTING AS REQUIRED BY 
THE ISP ST AND ARD OPERA TING PROCEDURES. 
The District Judge boiled down his decision on this issue to another conclusionary statement: 
"However, the petitioner has submitted no evidence that the tests were not completed according to 
the procedures set forth." R at pp. 495, 496. The Court simply disregards the issue of the 
perfonnance verification. For a Lifcloc device to have a valid evidentiary test, there has to be two 
valid breath samples and a performance verification within twenty-four (24) hours of the breath 
samples. A valid test is not found on this record. 
In this case there is no evidence of a performance verification noted within 24 hours. The 
only thing in the record is the print out from the breath machine that simply shows the two breath 
samples. R at p. 34. There is nothing on this record that shows the performance verification was 
completed. The arresting officer's Affidavit states: "Ewing provided two breath samples of .145 
and .142. Ewing was placed under arrest for DUI and transported to the Nez Perce County Detention 
Center where he was booked on the charge of DUI." Rat p. 36. The peace office does not say there 
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was a performance verification. The hearing officer uses boiler plate language from Officer Frary' s 
Affidavit that evidentiary test was performed in compliance with Idaho Law and ISP Standard 
Operating Procedures. Rat p. 285. The officer's Affidavit states: 
"Prior to being offered the test, the Defendant was substantially informed of the 
consequences of refusal and failure of the test as require by section 18-8002 and 18-
8002A, Idaho Code. Defendant was tested for alcohol concentration, drugs or other 
intoxicating substances. The test(s) was/were performed in compliance with sections 
18-8003 & 18-8004( 4 ), Idaho Code and the standards and methods were adopted by 
the Idaho State Police (ISP)." 
Ratp. 37. 
Mr. Ewing wasn't tested for drugs or other intoxicating substances. There was only one 
"test" performed. There was no compliance with § 18-8003. The appellate courts have looked with 
disfavor on the use of this boiler plate language from these Affidavits. See Peck v. State, 153 Id. 37 
(Ct. App. 2012) and Bennett v. State, 147 Id. 141 (Ct. App. 2009). 
The use of Kane v. State ofldaho, Department ofTramportation, 139 Idaho 586, (Ct. App. 
2004) to attack Mr. Ewing's argument is not proper because this is not a technical attack upon the 
adequacy of ITD's documentation. Mr. Ewing is not relying on the assertion of incomplete 
documentation. He is simply saying there is no performance verification. 
It should be noted that the legislature required, within 5 business days, following the service 
of a Notice, that the peace officer: 
"Shall forward to the Department a copy of the complete Notice of Suspension form 
upon which the date of service upon the Driver shall be clearly indicated, a certified 
copy or duplicate original of the results of all test alcohol concentration, and shown 
by analysis of breath administered at the direction of the peace officer, and a sworn 
statement of the officer, which may incorporate any arrest or incident reports relevant 
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to the arrest and evidentiary testing setting forth: ... " 
In this case, there wasn't evidence of compliance with I.C. § 18-8002A(7)(c) and ( d). Under 
the SOP (which is not a rule) there is a requirement that there be a performance verification within 
24 hours of breath testing. See SOP Section 5.1.3.: ·'A performance verification of ... Lifeloc FC20 
instruments using a 0.08 or a 0.20 performance verification standard must be performed within 24 
hours, before or after an evidentiary test to be approved for evidentiary use." (Emphasis added). This 
case can be distinguished from Archer v. State, 145 Id. 617 (Ct. App. 2008). In Mr. Archer's case, 
the Court indicated that attaching a calibration record to a test record is an act performed after the 
test itself is completed. The Court stated: "It could not have changed the validity of the test itself." 
At p. 621. However, this statement is wrong. First of all, there has to be a performance verification 
for a breath test to be approved for evidentiary use. Without a performance verification, there's not 
a valid test. How the Court in Archer came up with this language is unknown. The Court can be 
specific in distinguishing Archer based on the performance verification requirements found in the 
SOP from August 20, 2013. Please note that this is one of the areas in the SOP where a "must" still 
remains as a mandatory requirement for breath testing. Also in Archer the Court indicated the Mr. 
Archer could have subpoenaed the arresting officer and questioned him about a calibration check 
performed within 24 hours. Officer Frary did not do the performance verification so subpoenaing 
him would not have been helpful. Officer Frary' s police rep01i is also part of the records. R at pp 
42-43. The police report does not indicate that Officer Frary had contact with the other deputy or 
that Officer Frary was aware of any form of performance verification. Mr. Ewing would not have 
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been able to have a subpoena issued for the other deputy because he was not aware of the other 
deputy's involvement. However, he had requested the hearing officer issue subpoenas for the breath 
test specialist. At the time the request for hearing was made, Counsel would not have known who 
performed the performance verification. The subpoenas issued by ITD noted the information had 
to be provided to ITD by April 7, 2014, vvith the hearing being set for April 10, 2014. What these 
cases are leading to is having law enforcement officers file boiler plate language saying there's a 
valid breath test. The Court can note that substantial discovery was requested and substantial 
discovery was denied. The Archer case is not of much assistance to the State in this case. 
VII. 
CONCLUSION 
ISPFS has failed to follow the statutory mandate ofl.C. § l 8-8002A regarding "rule" making 
and thus the breath testing system in Idaho fails. LC. §67-5279 mandates a reversal because this 
action of the agency was unconstitutional, was beyond statutory authority and was arbitrary . In 
addition, the failure to have the ALS hearing within the 20 day time frame mandated by the 
legislature violated Mr. Ewing's due process rights, no hearing in a meaningful time or in a 
meaningful manner. An equal protection violation has also occurred. If one reads enough of the 
ALS hearing officers' decisions one will see that they treat the driver as the enemy. Almost any 
thing will be done to prevent a driver from winning at an ALS hearing. The hearing officer's failure 
to issue subpoenas in a timely fashion contributed to the delay. There was no good cause in this case 
as the "cause" was simply generated by the hearing officer's failure to act. The Court must set aside 
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the hearing officer's decision and send the matter back to the Department with instructions to set 
aside the suspension. 
DATED this 27th day of January, 2015. 
I hereby certify on the 2Th 
day of January, 2015, a true copy 
of the foregoing instrument 
was: ~Mailed 
Faxed 
Hand delivered to: 
Edwin L. Litteneker 
Special Deputy Attorney General 
Idaho Transportation Department 
P.O. Box 321 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
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LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
HOUSE BILL NO. 284 
) 
BY TRANSPORTATION AND DEFENSE COMMITTEE 
AN ACT 
Flrst Regular Seffion - 1997 
RELATING TO DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE; AMENDING SECTION 18-8002A, IDAHO 
CODE, TO ADD DEFINITIONS, TO REQUIRE PEACE OFFICERS TO INFORM DRIVERS AT 
THE TIME OF EVIDENTIARY TESTING OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFUSING TO SUBMIT 
TO· OR FAILING AN EVIDENTIARY TEST, TO PROVIDE RULEMAKING AUTHORITY OF THE 
DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, TO INCREASE THE TIME IN WHICH A 'PEACE OFFI-
CER MUST FORWARD A NOTICE OF SUSPENSION, TO ADD CODE REFERENCES, TO AUTHO-
RIZE PEACE OFFICERS TO SUBMIT A DUPLICATE COPY OF THE ORIGINAL TEST 
RESULTS WITH THEIR STATEMENTS, AND TO PROVIDE THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER 
WHICH TEMPORARY DRIVING PRIVILEGES WILL BE ISSUED; AMENDING SECTION 
18-80028, IDAHO CODE, TO STAY ENFORCEMENT OF SECTION 18-8002A, IDAHO CODE, 
UNTIL JANUARY 1, 1998 AND TO CORRECT A CODE REFERENCE; REPEALING SECTION 
18-8002B, IDAHO CODE; AMENDING SECTION 49-326, IDAHO CODE, TO REDUCE FROM 
TWENTY-ONE DAYS TO TWENTY DAY~, THE TIME THAT HEARINGS MUST BE HELD AFTER 
RECEIPT OF THE REQUEST, AUTHORIZING HEARING OFFICERS TO EXTEND THE HEARING 
DATE BY TEN DAYS FOR GOOD CAUSE SHOWN, AUTHORIZING BEARING OFFICERS TO 
ADMINISTER OATHS AND TO MAKE A TECHNICAL CORRECTION; AMENDING SECTION 
49-328, IDAHO CODE, TO ALLOW THE DEPARTMENT TO COLLECT ONLY ONE FEE PER 
REINSTATEMENT; AMENDING SECTION 49-330, IDAHO CODE, TO ALLOW DRIVERS WHOSE 
DRIVER'S LICENSES HAVE BEEN CANCELLED, SUSPENDED, DISQUALIFIED, OR 
RESTRICTED TO FILE A PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW; AND PROVIDING AN EFFEC-
TIVE DATE. 
Be It Enacted By The Legislature Of The State Of Idaho: 
SECTION 1. That Section 18-8002A, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby 
amended to read as follows: 
18-8002A. TESTS OF DRIVER FOR ALCOHOL CONCENTRATION, PRESENCE OF DRUGS OR 
OTHER INTOXICATING SUBSTANCES -- SUSPENSION UPON FAILURE OF TESTS. (1) Defini-
tions. As used in this section: 
(a) "Actual physical control" means being in the driver's position of a 
motot vehicle with the motor running ,or with the vehicle moving. 
(b) "Administrative headng" means a hearing conducted by a hearing offi-w to determine whether a suspension imposed by the provisions of this 
section should be vacated or sustained, 
(be) "Department" means the Idaho transportation department and, as the 
context requires, shall be construed to include any agent of the depart-
ment designated by rule as hereinafter provided. · 
{cg) 11Director" means the director of the Idaho transportatioQ depart-
ment. 
(e) "Evidentiary testing" means a procedure or test or series of proce-
dures or tests utilized to determine the concentration of alcohol or the 
presence of drugs or otlier intoxicating substances in a person 1 including 
additional testing authorized by subsection (6) of this section. An evi-








































































LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
HOUSE BILL NO. 284 
BY TRANSPORTATION AND DEFENSE COMMITTEE 
AN ACT 
First Regular Session - 1997 
RELATING TO DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE; AMENDING SECTION 18-8002A, IDAHO 
CODE, TO ADD DEFINITIONS, TO REQUIRE PEACE OFFICERS TO INFORM DRIVERS AT 
THE TIME OF EVIDENTIARY TESTING OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF REFUSING TO SUBMIT 
TO OR FAILING AN EVIDENTIARY TEST, TO PROVIDE RULEMAKING AUTHORITY OF THE 
DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, TO INCREASE THE TIME IN WHICH A PEACE OFFI-
CER MUST FORWARD A NOTICE OF SUSPENSION, TO ADD CODE REFERENCES, TO AUTHO-
RIZE PEACE OFFICERS TO SUBMIT A DUPLICATE COPY OF THE ORIGINAL TEST 
RESULTS WITH THEIR STATEMENTS, AND TO PROVIDE THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER 
WHICH TEMPORARY DRIVING PRIVILEGES WILL BE ISSUED; AMENDING SECTION 
18-8002B, IDAHO CODE, TO STAY ENFORCEMENT OF SECTION 18-8002A, IDAHO CODE, 
UNTIL JANUARY 1, 1998 AND TO CORRECT A CODE REFERENCE; REPEALING SECTION 
18-8002B, IDAHO CODE; AMENDING SECTION 49-326, IDAHO CODE, TO REDUCE FROM 
TWENTY-ONE DAYS TO TWENTY DAYS, THE TIME THAT HEARINGS MUST BE HELD AFTER 
RECEIPT OF THE REQUEST, AUTHORIZING HEARING OFFICERS TO EXTEND THE HEARING 
DATE BY TEN DAYS FOR GOOD CAUSE SHOWN, AUTHORIZING HEARING OFFICERS TO 
ADMINISTER OATHS AND TO MAKE A TECHNICAL CORRECTION; AMENDING SECTION 
49-328, IDAHO CODE, TO ALLOW THE DEPARTMENT TO COLLECT ONLY ONE FEE PER 
REINSTATEMENT; AMENDING SECTION 49-330, IDAHO CODE, TO ALLOW DRIVERS WHOSE 
DRIVER'S LICENSES HAVE BEEN CANCELLED, SUSPENDED, DISQUALIFIED, OR 
RESTRICTED TO FILE A PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW; AND PROVIDING AN EFFEC-
TIVE DATE. 
Be It Enacted By The Legislature Of The State Of Idaho: 
SECTION 1. That Section 18-8002A, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby 
amended to read as follows: 
18-8002A. TESTS OF DRIVER FOR ALCOHOL CONCENTRATION, PRESENCE OF DRUGS OR 
OTHER INTOXICATING SUBSTANCES -- SUSPENSION UPON FAILURE OF TESTS. (1) Defini-
tions. As used in this section: 
(a) "Actual physical control" means being in the driver's position of a 
motor vehicle with the motor running -0r with the vehi~le moving. 
(b) 11Administrative hearing" means a hearing conducted by a hearing offi-w to determine whether a suspension imposed by the provisions of this 
section should be vacated or sustained. 
(b£) "Department" means the Idaho transportation department and, as the 
context requires, shall be construed to include any agent of the depart-
ment designated by rule as hereinafter provided. 
(e.9) "Director" means the director of the Idaho transportation depart-
ment. 
(e) "Evidentiary testing" means a procedure or test or series of proce-
dures or tests utilized to determine the concentration of alcohol or the 
presence of drugs or other intoxicating substances in a person, including 
additional testing authorized by subsection (6) of this section. An evi-
























































































grams of alcohol per one hundred (100) cubic centimeters of blood, per two 
hundred ten (210) liters of breath. or sixty-seven (67) milliliters of 
urine. Analysis of blood, breath or urine for the purpose of determining 
alcohol concentration shall be performed bv a laboratory operated by the 
Idaho department of law enforcement or by a laboratory approved by the 
Idaho department of law enforcement under the provisions of approval and 
certification standards to be set by that department, or by any other 
method approved by the Idaho department of law enforcement. Notwithstand-
ing any other provision of law or rule of court, the results of any test 
for alcohol concentration ~nd records relating to calibration, approval, 
certification or quality control performed by a laboratory operated and 
approved by the Idaho department of law enforcement or by any other method 
approved by the Idaho department of law enforcement shall be admissible in 
any proceeding in this state without the necessity of producing a witness 
to establi~h the reliability of the testing procedure for examination. 
(d.f) "Hearing officer 11 means a person designated by the ~epartment to 
conduct administrative hearings. The hearing officer shall have authority 
to administer oaths, examine witnesses and take testimony, receive rele-
vant evidence, issue subpoenas, regulate the course and conduct of the 
hearing and make a final ruling on the issues before him. 
(eg) "Hearing request" means a request for an administrative hearing on 
the suspension imposed by the provisions of this section. 
(2) Information to be given. At the time of evidentiary testing for con-
centration of alcohol, or for the presence of drugs or other intoxicating sub-
stances is requested, the person shall be informed that if the person refuses 
to submit to or fails to complete evidentiary testing, or if the person sub-
mits to and completes evidentiary testing and the test results indicate an 
alcohol concentration or the presence of drugs or other intoxicating sub-
stances in violation of section 18-8004, 18-8004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code. the 
person shall be informed substantially as follows (but need not be informed 
verbatim): 
If you refuse to submit to or if you fail to complete and pass evidentiary 
testing for alcohol.or other intoxicating substances: 
(a) The peace officer will seize your driver's license and issue a notice 
of suspension and a temporary driving permit to you, but no peace officer 
will issue you a temporary driving permit if your driver's license or per-
mit has already been and is suspended or revoked. No peace officer shall 
issue a temporary driving permit to a driver of a commercial vehicle 'who 
refuses to submit to or fails to complete and pass an evidentiary test; 
(b) You have the right to request a hearing within seven (7) days of the 
notice·of suspension of your driver's license to show ·cause why you 
refused to submit to or to complete and pass evidentiary testing and why 
your driver's license should not be suspended; 
(c) If you refused or failed to complete evidentiary testing and do not 
request a hearing before the court or do not prevail at the hearing. your 
driver I s license will be s·uspended. The suspension will be for one hundred 
eighty (180) days if this is your first refusal. The suspension will be 
for one (1) year if this is your second refusal within five (5) years. You 
will not be able to obtain a temporary restricted license during that 
period; and 
(d) If you complete evidentiary testing and fail the testing and do not 
request a hearing before the department or do not prevail at the hearing. 
your driver's license will be suspended. This suspension will be for 
ninety (90) days if this is your first failure of evidentiary testing, but 



































































days. The suspension will be for one (1) year if this is your second fail-
ure of evidentiary testing within five (5) years. You will not be able to 
obtain a temporary restricted license during that period; 
(e) After submitting to evidentiary testing you may, when practicable, at 
your own expense. have additional tests made by a person of your own 
choosing. · 
(3) Rulemaking authority of the department of law enforcement. The Idaho 
department of law enforcement may, pursuant to chapter 52, title 67. Idaho 
Code, prescribe by rule: 
(a) A form restating the substance of the information required to be pro-
vided in subsection (2) o( this section, The information in this form 
shall be considered by operation of this section to comply with the infor-
mation required to be given by subsection (2) of this section; 
(b) What testing is required to complete ·evidentiary testing under this 
section; and 
(c) What calibration or checking or testing equipment must be performed 
to comply with the department's requirements. Unless the Idaho department 
of law enforcement has prescribed to the contrary by rule, the following 
shall apply: a test for alcohol concentration in breath as defined in sec-
tion 18-8004, Idaho Code, and subsection (l)(e) of this section will be 
valid for the purposes of this section if the breath alcohol testing 
instrument was approved for testing by the Idaho department of law 
enforcement in accordance with section 18-8004, Idaho Code, not more than 
ninety (90) davs before the evidentiary testing. A test for alcohol con-
centration in blood or urine as defined in section 18-8004, Idaho Code, 
that is reported by the Idaho department of law enforcement or by any lab-
oratory approved by the Idaho department of law enforcement to perform 
this test will be valid for the purposes of this serition. 
(4) Suspension, 
(a) Upon receipt of the sworn statement of a peace officer that there 
existed legal cause to believe a person had been driving or was in actual 
physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, 
drugs or other intoxicating substances and that the person submitted to a 
test and the test results indicated an alcohol concentration or the pres-
ence of drugs or other intoxicating substances in violation of section 
18-8004, 18-8004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code, the department shall suspend the 
person's driver's license, or driver's permiti to-drive driving privileges 
or non-resident driving privileges: 
(i) ·For a period of ninety (90) days for a first failure of eviden-
tiary, testing ~nder the provisions of this section. The first thirty 
{30) days of the suspension shall be absolute and the person shall 
have absolutely no driving privileges of any kind. Restricted driv-
ing privileges applicable during the remaining sixty (60) days of the 
suspension may be requested as provided in subsection (6~) of this 
section. 
(ii) For a period of one (1) year for a second and any subsequent 
failure of evidentiary testing under the provisions of this · section 
within the immediately preceding five (5) years. No driving privi-
leges of any kind shall be granted during the suspension imposed pur-
suant to this subsection. 
The person may request an administrative hearing on the suspension as 
provided in subsection (61) of this section. Any right to contest the 
suspension shall be waived if a hearing is not requested as therein 
provided. 
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upon the person of the notice of suspension. The notice shall be in a form 
provided by the department and shall state: 
(i) The reason and statutory grounds for the suspension; 
(ii) The effective date of the suspension; 
(iii) The suspension periods to which the person may be subject as 
provided in subsection (r1)(a) of this section; 
(iv) The procedures for obtaining restricted driving privileges; 
(v) The rights of the person to request an administrative hearing 
on the suspension and that if an administrative hearing 1s not 
requested within seven (7) days of service of the notice of suspen-
sion the right to contest the suspension shall be waived; 
(vi) The procedures for obtaining an administrative hearing on the 
suspension; 
(vii) The right to judicial review of the hearing officer's decision 





























(42) Service of suspension by peace officer. If the driver submits to 
evidentiary testing after the information in seetion-¼8-809rf31,--fdaho--€ode, 
and subsection (3~) of this section has been provided and the results of the 
test indicate an alcohol concentration or the presence of drugs or other 
intoxicating substances in violation of the provisions of section 18-8004, 
18-8004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code: 
(a) The peace officer shall take possession of the person's driver's 
license, shall i~sue a temporary permit which shall be valid for a period 
not to exceed thirty (30) days from the date of issuance, and, acting on 
behalf of the department, shall serve the person with a notice of suspen-
sion 1n the form and containing the information required under subsection 







































































(b) Within three five (3~) business days following service of a notice of 
suspension the peace officer shall forward to the department a copy of the 
completed notice of suspension form upon which the date of service upon 
the driver shall be clearly indicated, a copy of any completed temporary 
permit form along with any confiscated driver's license, and a sworn 
statement- of the officer setting forth: 
(i} The identity of the person; 
(ii) Stating the officer's legal cause to stop the person; 
(iii) Stating the officer's legal cause to believe that the person 
had been driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle 
while under the influence of alcohol, drugs or other intoxicating 
substances in violation of the prov1s1ons of section 18-8004, 
18-8004C or 18-8006 1 Idaho Code; 
(iv) That the person was advised of the consequences of taking and 
failing the evidentiary test as provided in subsection (31) of this 
section; 
(v} That the person was lawfully arrested; 
{vi) That the person was tested for alcohol concentration, drugs or 
other intoxicating substances as provided in this chapter, and that 
the results of the test indicated an alcohol concentration or the 
presence of drugs or other intoxicating substances in violation of 
the provisions of section 18-8004, 18-8004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code. 
A certified copy or duplicate original of the results of all tests for alcohol 
concentration, drugs or other intoxicating substances as shown by analysis of 
blood, urine or breath administered at the direction of the officer shall 
accompany the officer's statement. The sworn statement required in this sub-
section shall be made on forms in accordance with rules adopted by the depart-
ment. 
(5£) Additional tests. After submitting to evidentiary testing at the 
request of the peace officer, the person may, when practicable, at his own 
expense, have additional tests for alcohol concentration or for the preience 
of drugs or other intoxicating substances made by a person of his own choos-
ing. The person's failure or inability to obtain additional tests shall not 
preclude admission of the results of evidentiary tests administered at the 
direction of the peace officer unless additional testing was denied by the 
peace officer. 
(67) Administrative hearing on suspension. A person who has been served 
with ~ notice of suspension after submitting to an evidentiary test may 
request an administrative hearing on the suspension before a hearing officer 
designated by the department. The requ-est for hearing shall ,be in writing and 
must be received by the department within seven (7} calendar days of the date 
of service upon the person of the notice of suspension, and shall include what 
issue or issues shall be raised at the nearing. The date on which the hearing 
request was received shall be noted on the face of the request. ~he-person-may 
n~e-the-form-pro~ided-by-the-department-to-request--an-admin±strat±ve--hearing 
on-the-snspens±on;-but-use-of-the-£orm-±s-not-requ±rea~ 
If a hearing is requested, the hearing shall be held within twenty (20) 
days of the date the hearing request was received by the department unless 
this period is, for good cause shown, extended by the hearing officer for one 
ten (10) day period. Such extension shall not operate as a stay of the suspen-
sion and any temporary permit shall expire thirty (30) days after service of 
the notice of suspension, notwithstanding an extension of the hearing date 
beyond such thirty (30) day period. Written notice of the date, and time and 
p±aee of the hearing shall be sent to the party requesting the hearing at 

























































































conduct all or-part-of-the hearing~ by telephone,-tetevision,-or-other-etec-
tronic-mean~, if each participant in the hearing has an opportunity to partic-





The hearing shall be recorded. The sworn statement of the arresting.offi-
cer, and the copy of the notice of suspension and any temporary permit issued 
by the officer shall be admissible at the hearing without further evidentiary 
foundation. The results of any tests for alcohol concentration or the presence 
of drugs or other intoxicating substances by analysis of blood, urine or 
breath administered at the direction of the peace officer and the records 
relating to calibration, certification, approval or quality control pertaining 
to equipment utilized to perform the tests shall be admissible as provided in 
section 18-8004(4), Idaho Code. The arresting officer shall not be required to 
appear participate unless directed to do so by a subpoena issued by the hear-
ing officer. 
The burden of proof shall be on the person requesting the hearing. The 
hearing officer shall not vacate the suspension if unless he finds, by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, that: 
(a) The peace officer did not have legal cause to stop the person; or 
(b) The officer did not have legal cause to believe the person had been 
driving or was in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the 
infl.uence of alcohol, drugs or other intoxicating substances in violation 
of the provisions of section 18-8004, 18-8004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code; or 
(c) The test results did not show an alcohol concentration or the pres-
ence of drugs or other intoxicating substances in violation of section 
18-8004, 18-8004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code; or 
(d) · The tests for alcohol concentration, drugs or other intoxicating sub-
stances administered at the direction of the peace officer were not con-
ducted in accordance with the requirements of section 18-8004(4), Idaho 
Code, or the testing equipment was not functioning properly when the test 
was administered; or · 
(e) The person was not informed of the consequences of submitting to evi-
dentiary testing as required in subsection (31) of this section. 
If the hearing officer finds that the person has not met his burden of 
proof, he shall sustain the suspension. The hearing officer shall make 
findings of fact and conclusions of law on each issue and shall enter an 
order vacating or sustaining the suspension, If the suspension is vacated, 
-the person's driver's license, unless unavailable by reason of an existing 
suspension, revocation, cancellation, disqualification or denial shall be 
returned to him. The findings of fact, conclusions of law and order 
entered by the hearing officer shall be considered a final order pursuant 
to the provisions of chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code, except that no 
motions for reconsideration of such order shall be allowed and new evi-
dence can be submitted. 
The facts as found by the hearing officer shall b·e independent of the 
determination of the same or similar facts in the adjudication of any criminal 
charges arising out of the same occurrence. The disposit~on of those criminal 
charges shall not affect the suspension required to be imposed under the pro-
v1s1ons of this section. If a license is suspended under this section and the 
person is also convicted on criminal charges arising out of the same occur-
rence for a violation of the provisions of section 18-8004, 18-8004C or 
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imposed pursuant to the provisions of section 18-8005 or 18-8006, Idaho Code, 
shall be imposed, but the periods of suspension m~y shall run concurrently, 
with the total period of suspension not to exceed the longer of the applicable 
suspension periods, unless the court ordering the suspension in the criminal 
case orders to the contrary. 
(7~) Judicial review. A party aggrieved by the decision of the hearing 
officer may seek judicial review of the decision in the manner provided for 
judicial review of final agency action provided in chapter 52, title 67, Idaho 
Code. 
(89) Restricted driving privileges. A person served with a notice of sus-
pension for ninety (90) days pursuant to this section may apply to the depart-
ment for restricted driving privileges, to become effective after the thirty 
(30) day absolute suspension has been completed. The request may be made at 
any time after service of the notice of suspension. Restricted driving privi-
leges will be issued for the person to travel to and from work and for work 
purposes. to attend an alternative high school. work on a GED, for post-
secondary education, or to meet the medical needs of the person or his family 
if the person is eligible for restricted driving privileges. 
(91.Q) Rules. The department may adopt rules under the provisions of chap-
ter 52, title 67, Idaho Code, deemed necessary to implement the provisions of 
this section. 
SECTION 2. That Section 18-8002B, Idaho Cod~, be, and the same 1s hereby 
amended to read as follows: 
18-8002B. ENFORCEMENT OF 18-8002A, IDAHO CODE, STAYED. On and after the 
effective date of this act and until att~y January 1, 199¥~, no peace officer 
in the state of Idaho shall enforce the provisions of section 18-8002A, Idaho 
Code. 
SECTION 3. That Section 18-8002B, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby 
repealed. 
StCTION 4. That Section 49-326, Idaho Code, be, and the same 1s hereby 
amended to read as follows: 
49-326. AijTHORITY OF DEPARTMENT TO SUSPEND, DISQUALIFY OR REVOKE DRIVER'S 
LICENSE AND PRIVILEGES. (l) If the court has not ordered the suspension ·of a 
license or privileges, the department is authorized to suspend, disqualify or 
revoke the license or privileges of a driver without preliminary hearing upon 
a showing ·by its records or other sufficient evidence that the driver: 
(a) Has committed an offense for which mandatory revocation or disquali-
fication of license or privileges is required upon conviction; 
(b) Has been convicted in any court in this state of an offense against a -
municipal ordinance which would have been grounds for suspension, revoca-
tion or disqualification~£ his driver's license or privileges had the 
charge been prosecuted under a state law; 
(c) Is incompetent to drive a motor vehicle; 
1. Any person who in the opinion of the department, based upon rec-
ommendation of the person's personal physician, is afflicted with or 
subject to any condition.which brings about momentary or prolonged 
lapses of consciousness or control, which is or may become chronic, 
or when the person is suffering from a physical or mental disability 
or disease serving to prevent him from exercising reasonable and 




























































































streets and highways, or any person who is unable to understand high-
way signs, warning, regulating or directing traffic, is incompetent 
to drive a motor vehicle. 
2. Any person who shall not have minimum visual acuity with or with-
out corrective lenses of 20/40 in at least one (1) eye as determined 
by the Snellen system or other available systems is incompetent to 
operate a motor vehicle, however, the department shall have the 
authority to license such person upon the recommendation of an oph-
thalmologist or qualified ·physician and upon passage of a skills 
test. At 20/70 or more in both eyes with or without corrective lenses 
the department may suspend the driver's license and privileges. ~,ny 
person who applies for or receives any type of tax, welfare or other 
benefits or exemptions for the blind shall be conclusively presumed 
incompetent to operate a motor vehfcle. 
3. Any person, department, or political subdivision of the state of 
Idaho who receives an application for any type of tax, welfare, aid 
or other benefits or exemptions for the blind shall immediately for-
ward the name, address, sex, date of birth, and date of application 
of the applicant to the department; 
(d) Has permitted an unlawful or fraudulent use of a driver's license; 
(e) Has committed an offense in another state which if committed in Idaho 
would be grounds for suspension, disqualification or revocation; 
(f) Has been convicted of the offense of reckless driving, or fleeing or 
attempting to elude a peace officer, and providing that the operating 
privilege shall be suspended for a period of thirty (30) days upon convic-
tion and providing further, that if a second conviction occurs within a 
two (2) year period of time from the time of the first conviction, the 
suspension shall be for ninety (90) days, and if a third conviction shall 
occur within a three (3) year period of time from the time of the first 
conviction, the period of suspension shall be for one (1) year; 
(g) Has failed to satisfy a judgment as set forth in chapter 12, title 
49, Idaho Code; 
(h) Has failed to maintain proof of financial responsibility as set forth 
in chapter 12, title 49, Idaho Code; 
(i) Has a driving record which shows a violation point count of twelve 
(12) or more points in any consecutive twelve (12) month period; 
(j) Is an habitual violator of traffic laws; · 
(k) Has been convicted of the offense of violation of a restricted 
license and providing the driver's license and privileges be suspended for 
a period of thirty (30) days; 
(1) Has been convicted for the offense of leaving the scene of an acci-
dent involving damages to a vehicle, the period of revocation shall be one 
(1) year; 
(m) Has been 
dent resulting 
. (1) year.-1 
convicted for the offense of leaving the scene of an acc1-
in injury or death, the period of revocation shall be one 
(n) Is under the age of eighteen (18) years and is not satisfactorily 
enrolled in school, has not received a waiver pursuant to or has not com-
pleted school as provided in section 49-303A, Idaho Code. 
(2) A violation point is assessed for conviction of any charge or with 
proof of any infraction involving a moving traffic vfolation. A value of one 
(1) point. shall be given for a less serious violation and up to four (4) 
points for a more serious violation. Conv1ction or proof of infraction for 
only one (1) violation arising from one (1) occasion of arrest or citation 
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(3) The department is authorized and directed to establish a violation 
point count system for various moving traffic violations and infractions 
occurring either within or without the state of Idaho, affecting all holders 
of driver's licenses issued by the department. 
(4) Notification of suspension, revocation, cancellation or disqualifica-
tion. Upon suspending, revoking, canceling or disqualifying the driver's 
license or driving privileges of any person, the department shall immediately 
notify the applicant or licensee in writing, at the licensee's address on file 
with the department pursuant to section 49-320, Idaho Code. Upon his request 
the department shall afford him an opportunity for a hearing before the-diree-
tor-or a hearing officer appointed by the director. The hearing shatt may be_ 
held by telephone within twenty-one (2-i-Q) days after receipt of the request..,_ 
unless this period is for good ·cause shown, extended by the hearing officer 
for one ten-day period. fhe-ptaee-of-the-hearing-shatt-be-designated-by-rnte 
of-the-department-±n-one-{¾7-or-more-toeat±on-in-eaeh--of--the--admini$trative 
distriets--of--the-department-whieh-are-headqnartered-at-8oenr-dLAtene,-~ewis-
ton,-Boi$e,-Sho$hone,-Poeatetto-and-Rigby. The notice and hearing shall be 
required prior to the imposition of additional suspension or disqualification 
periods beyond the periods as set forth in this section. Upon a hearing the 
direetor--or--h±$--dnty-anthorized-agent hearing officer may administer oaths, 
may issue subpoenas for the attendance of witnesses and the production of rel-
evant books and papers, and may require a reexamination of the licensee, Upon 
the hearing the department shall either rescind its order or, with good cause, 
may affirm or extend the suspension or disqualification of the driver's 
license or revoke the driver's license. 
Whenever a driver's license, permit or driving privilege has been sus-
pended or revoked by the department as provided in this section, other t·han as 
set forth in subsection (l)(c), (d), (g), (h), (m) or (n), the department may 
issue a temporary restricted permit restricting the time, area and purpose of 
use. The application, eligibility requirements and form of the temporary 
restricted permit shall be provided by administrative rule • 
(S) The department shall not suspend a driver's license or privileges for 
a period of more than one(!) year and upon revoking a driver's license or 
privileges shall not in any event grant application for a new driver's license 
until the expiration of one (1) year after the revocation. The provisions of 
this subsection shall not be applicable with respect to the issuance of tempo-
rary restricted permits as provided in section 49-325, Idaho Code. 
(6) The department shall not disqualify a driver for a period longer than 
specified by 49 CFR part 383. 
SECTION 5. That Section 49-328, Idaho Code, be, and the same 1s hereby 
amended to read as follows. 
49-328, REINSTATEMENT OF REVOKED, DISQUALIFIED OR SUSPENDED DRIVER'S. 
LICENSE -- FEE -- WHEN REINSTATEMENT PROHIBITED. {l) When the period of revo-
cation,· disqualification or suspension of a driver's license has expired, or 
the reason for the revocation, disqualification or suspension no longer 
exists, the department shall reinstate the driver's license or driving privi-
leges on application of the driver. 
(2) The application shall be in the form prescribed by the department and 
accompanied by a reinstatement fee of fifteen dollars ($15.00} which shall be 
deposited in the state highway account. 
(23) A driver's license which has been suspended under section 49-1505, 
Idaho -Code, for failure to pay an infraction penalty shall not be reinstated 
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(31) In addition to any other fees required in this section to be col-
lected, the department shall collect twenty-five dollars ($25.00) for rein-
stating a driver's license after conviction for driving under the influence, 
without privileges, and after conviction or other violation of any other traf-
fic related ·misdemeanor or infraction, of which fees twenty dollars ($20.00) 
shall be paid over to the county treasurer of the county in which the convic-
tion occurred for support of that county's justice fund, or the current 
expense fund if no county justice fund has been established and the five dol-
lars ($5.00) shall be deposited in the state highway account. 
(4~) In addition to any other fees required in this section to be col-
lected, the department shall collect one hundred fifteen dollars ($115) for 
reinstating a driver's license after a suspension imposed under the provisions 
of section 18-8002 or section 18-8002A, Idaho Code, or after a suspension 
arising out of any alcohol or drug related offense, other than a suspension 
imposed upon a person under eighteen (18) years of age pursuant to section 
18-1502(d), Idaho Code. Funds collected pursuant to this subsection shall be 
deposited in the state highway account. The department shall reevaluate the 
amount of the reinstatement fee herein imposed not later than February, ±996 
2000, to determine the sufficiency of the fee to meet the costs associated 
with the implementation of section 18-8002A, Idaho Code. 
(6) When there is more than one (1) reason why a driver's license was 
revoked or suspended or why a driver was disqualified, the department shall 
not collect multiple fees for reinstatement, but shall only collect one (1) 
reinstatement fee. which shall be the greater reinstatement fee, provided how-
ever, the department shall collect two (2) reinstatement fees for reinstating 
a driver's license for multiple suspensions under chapter 80, title 18, Idaho 
Code, arising from the same occurrence. 
SECTION 6. That Section 49-330, Idaho Code, be, and the same 1s hereby 
amended to read as follows. 
49-330. RIGHT OF APPEAL TO COURT. Any person denied a driver's license Qi'. 
the department or whose driver's license has been cancelledt suspended, dis-
qualifiedi or revoked, or restricted by the department,-except-where-sospen-







for judicial review pursuant to chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code. 
SECTION 7. Sections 1, 2, 4, Sand 6 of this act shall be in full force 
and effect on and after July 1, 1997, Section 3 of this act shall be 1n full 
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Approved Vendor: A S()urce/provider/manufacturer of an approved premixed alcohol simulator solution shall be explicitly 
approved as a vendor of premixed alcohol simulator solutions for distn1>ution within Idaho. 
Breath Alcohol Test A series of separate breath samples provided during a breath testing sequence. 
Breath Aleollol Testing Sequence: A sequence of events as detennined by the Idaho State Police Forensic Services, which 
may be directed by either the instrument or the operator, but not both, and may consist of air blanks, perfonnance 
verification. internal standard checks, and breath samples. 
Breath Testing Specialist (BTS): An operator who has completed an advanced training class taught by an employee of the 
Idaho State Police Forensic Services. BTS certification is valid for 26 calendar months and expires on the last day of the 
26th month. 
Certiflcate of Analysis: A certificate stating that the premixed ethyl alcohol solutions used for performance verification have 
been tested and approved for use by the ISPFS. 
Certificate of Approval: A certificate stating that an individual breath alcohol testing iDslrument has been evaluated by the 
ISPFS and found to be suitable for forensic alcohol testing. The certificate bears the signature of an Idaho State Police 
Forensic Services Lab Manager, and the effective date of the instrument approval. 
Changeover Class: A training class for currently certified personnel during which they are taught theory, operation, and 
proper testing procedure for a new make or model of instrument being adopted by their agency. Breath Testing Specialists 
attend BTS training that qualifies them to perform BTS duties related to the instrument 
Evidentiary Test: A breath test perfonned on a subject/individual for potential evidentiary or legal purposes. A distinction 
is made between evidentiary testing and community service or training tests performed with the instrument 
Idaho State Police Forensic Services (ISPFS): Formerly known as the Bureau of Forensic Services, the ISPFS is dedicated 
to providing forensic science servi~ to the criminal justice system of Idaho. ISPFS is the administrative body for the 
breath alcohol testing program per IDAPA I 1.03.01. 
MIP/MIC: An abbreviation used to designate minor in possession or minor in consumption of alcohol. 
Operator Certification: The condition of having satisfied the training requirements for administering breath alcohol tests as 
established by the ISPFS. Operator certification is valid for 26 calendar months and expires on the last day of the 26th 
month. 
Operator: An individual certified by the ISPFS as qualified by training to administer breath alcohol tests. 
Operator Class: An ISPFS-approved training class for prospective or uncertified breath alcohol operators. Currently 
certified Breath Testing Specialists may teach operator classes. 
Performance Verification: A verification of the accuracy of the breath testing instrument utilizing a simulator and a 
performance verification solution. Performance verification should be reported to three decimal places. While ISPFS uses 
the term perfonnance verification, manutacturers and others may use a tenn such as "calibration check" or "simulator check." 
Performance Verineation Solution: A premixed ethyl alcohol solution used for field performance verifications. The 
solution is provided by and/or approved by ISPFS. 
Recertification Class: A training class for currently certified personnel. completion of which teSults in uninterrupted 
continuation of their Operator or BTS status for an additional 26 months. 
Waiting Period/Monitoring Period/Deprivation Period/Observation Period: 1 S-minute period prior to administering a 
breath alcohol test. in which an officer monitors the test subject/individual. 
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Breath Alcohol Standard Operating Procedure 
List of Revisions 
Ismls 
Delete reference to ALS 
0.02/0.20 solutions 
Valid breath tests 
Alco-Sensor calibration checks 
lntoxilyzer 5000 Calibration Checks 
Effective June, l 996 
0.003 agreement 
Operators may run caJibration checks 
Re-run a solution within 24 hours 
All 3 solutions run within a 24-hour period 
All 3 solutions run within a 24-hour period 
Re-running of a solution 
All solutions run within a 48-hour period 
Reference to "three" removed 
AH 3 solutions run within a 48-hour period 
More than three calibration solutions 
Solution values no longer called in to BFS 
Alco-Sensor and Intoxily:zer 5000 
calibration check 
Calibration checks for the Intoxily:zer 5000 
Name change, all references made to the 
Bureau of Forensic Services were changed to 
Idaho State Police Forensic Services. 
Record Management 
Deleted sections on relocating. repairing, recalibrating. 
and loaning of instruments from previous revision. 
Date or Reytslou 
June 1, 1995 
June 1, 1995 
October 23, 199S 
May I, 1996 
May 1, 1996 
June 1, 1996 
July 1, 1996 
September 6, 1996 
September 6, 1996 
September 6, 1996 
September 26, I 996 
September 26, 1996 
Oct 8, 1996 
September 26, 1996 
October 8, 1996 
April 1, 1997 
August 1, I 998 
Febnuuy 11, 1999 
August 1999 
August I, ~999 
August 1, 1999 
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Sections l, 2, 3 
2.1.4, 2.2.3, 2.2.4, 2.2.5 
And2.2.IO 
2.1.3, 2.1.4.1, 2.1.9 
Alco-Sensor and Intoxilyzer 5000 calibration checks 
Deleted sections on blood and urine samples 
for alcohol determination 
Operator certification record management 
Refonnat numbering 
Requirement for running 0.20 simulator solution 
Changed 3-sample to "two print cards". 
Deleted "simulator port" and "two print cards". 
Simulator temperature changed ftom "should" 
to"must". 
Clarification of 0.20 calibration checks. 
Added the Lifeloc FC20 
Deleted requirement that the new instrument 
utilize the same technology if the BT$ is currently 
certified 
Modified the accepted range for simulator solutions to 
+/- 10%, eliminating the +/-0.01 provision. Added 
"Established target values may be different 
from those shown on the bottle label" 
Added Lifeloc FC20 calibration checks 
Intoxilyzer 5000 calibration is now section 2.3 
Modified to specifically allow use of the 0.20 
during subject testing 
General refonnat for clarification. Combined 
Alcosensor and Llfeloc sections. Specifically. 
changed calibration requirement using the 0.20 
reference solution from four ( 4) checks to two (2). 
Clarification: a "calibration check" consists of a 
pair of samples in sequence and both samples 
must be within the acceptable range before 
proceeding with subject testing. A 0.20 solution 
should be replaced every 20-25 samples. Clarified 
the correct procedure for performing a calibration check. 
August 1, 1999 
August J, 1999 
January 29, 2001 
August I 8, 2006 
November 27, 2006 
May 14, 2007 
May 14,2007 
September 18, 2007 
February 13, 2008 
February 13, 2008 
February 13, 2008 
February 13, 2008 
February 13, 2008 
December I, 2008 
January 14, 2009 
Clarification: Added "before and ofter" to the 0.080 and July 7, 2009 
0.200 calibration checks, within 24 hours of a subject test. 
The official time and date of the calibration check is the 
time and date recorded on the printout, or the time and date 
recorded in the log, whichever co"uponds to the calibration 
check referenced in section 2. 1.3 or 2.1.4. J. 
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Revision# Effective date 
0 81.20/2010 
History 
The entire SOP was rewritten to incorporate language changes regarding 
perfonnance verifications, and to clear-up ambiguities associated with 
the 0.20 verification and the relevance to cases not involving an 18-
8004c charge. Scope and safety sections were added. Troubleshooting. 
MlP/MIC sections added. 
Idaho Breath Alcohol Standard Operating Procedure 
Issuing Authority---ISPFS Quality Manager 
Revision O Effective 8/20/20 l 0 






Section .2: Scope 
Section 3: Safety 




Section 5: Performance Verification of Approved Breath Testing Instruments 
















Section 7: Troubleshooting 
Section 8: MIP/MIC Procedure 
page 15 
page 16 
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Quantitative Analysis for Alcohol in Breath by Approved 
Breath Testing Instruments. 
Scope 
This method describes the Idaho State Police Forensic Services (ISPFS) 
procedure, for use by agencies external to ISPFS, for the analysis of breath for the 
presence of volatile compounds using an approved breath testing instrument This 
method provides for the quantitative analysis of ethanol. 
Following all the recommendations of this external procedure will establish the 
scientific validity and set the unquestioned foundational admissibility of the breath 
alcohol test. Failure to meet all of the recommendations within this procedure does not 
disqualify the breath alcohol test, but does allow for the questioning of the breath alcohol 
tests as it pertains to its foundation of admissibility in court. That foundation can be set, 
through testimony, by a breath testing specialist expert or ISPFS expert in breath testing 
as to the potential ramifications of the deviation from the procedure as stated. 
Safety 
Within the discipline of breath alcohol testing, the general bioha7.ard safety 
precaustions should be followed. This is due to the potential infectious materials that 
may be ejected from the mouth during the sampling of the breath. Caution should be 
taken so as the expired breath is not directed towards the officer or other unrelated 
bystander. · 
Instrument and Operator Certification 
To ensure that minimum standards are met, individual breath testing instruments, 
operators, and breath testing specialists (BTS) must be approved and certified by the 
Idaho State Police Forensic Services (ISPFS). The ISPFS will establish and maintain a 
list of approved instruments by manufacturer brand or model designation for use in the 
state. 
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4.1 Approval of Breath Testing Instruments. In order to be approved and certified 
each instrument must meet the following criteria: 
4.1.1 The instrument shall analyze a reference sample or analytical test standard, 
the results of which must agree within+/- 10% of the target value or such 
limits set by ISPFS. 
4.1.2 The certification procedures shall be adequate and appropriate for the 
analyses of breath specimens for the determination of alcohol 
concentration for law enforcement. 
4.1.3 Any other tests deemed necessary to correctly and adequately evaluate the 
instrument to give accmate results in routine breath alcohol testing. 
4.2 The ISPFS may, for cause, remove a specific instrument by serial number from 
evidential testing and suspend or withdraw certification thereof. 
4.3 Operators become certified ~y completing a training class taught by an ISPFS 
certified Breath Testing Specialist (BTS). Certification is for 26 calendar months 
and expires the last day of the 26th month. Certification will allow the operator to 
perform all functions required to obtain a valid breath alcohol test It is the 
responsibility of the individual operator to maintain their current certification; the 
ISPFS will not notify operators that their certification is about to expire. 
4.3.1 Recertification for another 26-month period is achieved by completing an 
ISPFS approved Operator class prior to the end of the 26th month. 
4.3.2 If the individual fails to satisfactorily complete the class (including the 
written and practical tests), or allows their certification status to expire, 
he/she must retake the operator class in order to become re-certified. 
4.3.3 If current Operator certification is voided, the individual is not certified to 
nm evidentiary breath alcohol tests on the instrument in question until the 
opera.tor class is completed. 
4.3.3.1 There are no grace periods or provisions for extension of operator 
certification. 
4.4 Breath Testing Specialists (BTS) are Operators who have completed an 
advanced training class and are ISPFS-certified to perform instrument 
maintenance, and provide both initial and recertification training for instrument 
operators. 
4.4.1 To obtain initial BTS certification, an individual must be currently 
certified as an Operator of that particular instrument. BTS certification is 
then obtained by completing an approved BTS training class. 
4.4.2 Certification is valid for 26 calendar months. 
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4.4.3 If BTS certification is allowed to expire. the individual reverts to certified 
Operator status for 12 calendar months for that instrument. H~she may 
no longet perform any BTS specific duties relating to that particular 
instrument. 
4.4.4 BTS certification is renewable by attending an approved BTS training 
class. 
4.4.5 The Idaho State Police Forensic Services may revoke BTS certification for 
cause. Examples may include falsification of records, failure to perform 
required performance verification, failure to successfully pass a BTS re-
certification class and failure to meet standards in conducting operator 
training. 
4.5 Adoption of a new instrument by an agency will require updating any BTS and 
Operators in that agency in the use of the new instrwnent. 
4.5.1 A currently certified BTS may become a certified BTS for a new 
instrument by completing an ISPFS approved BTS Instrumentation class. 
4.5.2 A currently certified Operator may certify on a new instrument by 
completing an ISPFS approved Operator Instrumentation Class for the 
new instrument. 
4.5.3 Individuals not currently certified as Operators must complete an 
Operator Class for each approved instrument. 
4.6 Record maintenance and management. It is the responsibility of each 
individual agency to store performance verification records, subject records, 
maintenance records, instrument logs, or any other records as p~rtaining to the 
evidentiary use of breath testing instruments and to maintain a current record of 
operator certification. 
4.6.1 It is the responsibility of the agency to see that the said records are stored 
and maintained a minimum of (3) years in accordance with IDAP A 
11.03.01. 
4.6.1.1 Records may be subject to periodic review by the Idaho State 
Police Forensic Services. 
4.6.2 The Idaho State Police Forensic Services will not be responsible for the 
storage of such records not generated by ISPFS. 
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5. Performance Verification of Breath Testing Instruments 
Performance verifications aid the Breath Testing Specialist (BTS) and the Idaho State 
Police Forensic Services (ISPFS) in determining if a breath testing instrument is 
functioning correctly. Performance verifications are performed using a wet bath 
simulator performance verification solution. The solution is provided by and/or approved 
by ISPFS. The ISPFS analysis establishes the target value and acceptable range of the 
solutions used for the verification and includes the acceptable values on the Certificate of 
Analysis for each solution. Note: The ISP established target values may be different 
from those shown on the bottle label. 
5.1 Alco-Sensor and Lifeloc FC20 - Portable Breath Testing Instrument 
Performance Verification 
5.1.1 The Alco-Sensor and Lifeloc FC20 portable breath testing instrument 
performance verification is run using approximately 0.08 and/or 0.20 
performance verification solutions provided by and/or approved by ISPFS . 
5.1.2 The performance verification using the 0.08 and 0.20 performance 
verification solutions consist of two samples separated by air blanks. 
5. 1.3 A perfonnance verification of the Alco-Sensor and Lifeloc FC20 
instruments using a 0.08 performance verification solution must be 
performed within 24 hours, before or after an evidentiary test to be 
approved for evidentiary use. Multiple breath alcohol tests may be 
covered by a single performance verification. 
5.1.3.1 A 0.08 performance verification solution should be replaced with 
fresh solution approximately every 25 verifications or every 
calendar month, whichever comes first. 
5.1.4 A 0.20 performance verification should be run and results logged once per 
calendar month and replaced with fresh solution approximately every 25 
verifications. 
NOTE: The 0.020 performance verification was implemented for the sole 
purpose of supporting the instruments results for an 18-8004c charge. In 
the absence of an l 8-8004c charge, the 0.20 verifications, or lack thereof, 
shall have no relevance to the results or the evidentiary value of the 
evidentiary test. 
5.1.4.1 The 0.20 performance verification satisfies the requirement for 
performance verification within 24 hours, before or after an 
evidentiary test. The 0.20 performance verification solution should 
not be used routinely for this purpose. 
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5.1.5 Acceptable results for a 0.080 or 0.20 performance verification is a pair of 
samples in sequence that are both within +/. 10% of the performance 
verification solution target value. Target values and ranges of acceptable 
results are included in a certificate of analysis for each solution lot series, 
prepared by, and available from, the ISPFS. 
NOTE: Due to external factors associated with changing a 
performance verification solution (examples include: ambient air 
in the sample chamber, temperature fluctuation) the results of the 
initial performance verification may not be within the acceptable 
range, therefore the performance verification may be repeated until 
a pair of satisfactory results are obtained. However, if results after 
a total of three runs for any solution (equivalent to six tests) are 
still unsatisfactory, contact the appropriate ISPFS Laboratory. The 
instrument should not be used for evidentiary testing until the 
problem is corrected and performance verification results are 
within the acceptable range. The suggested troubleshooting 
procedure should be followed if the initial performance verification 
does not meet the acceptance criteria. 
5.1.6 Temperature of the simulator must be between 33.5°C and 34.5°C in order 
for the performance verification results to be valid. 
NOTE: The simulator may need to warm for approximately 15 minutes to 
insure that the metal lid is also warm. If the lid is cold, condensation of 
alcohol vapor may occur producing low results. 
5.1.7 Performance verification solutions should only be used prior to the 
expiration date on the label. 
5.1.8 An agency may run additional performance verification solution levels at 
their discretion. 
5.1.9 The official time and date of the performance verification is the time and 
date recorded on the printout, or the time and date recorded in the log, 
whichever corresponds to the performance verification referenced in 
section 5.1.3 or 5.1.4.1. 
5.2 Intoxilyzer 5000/EN Performance Verification 
Intoxilyzer 5000/EN instruments must have a performance verification with each 
evidentiary test If the performance verification is within the acceptable range for 
the lot of solution being used, then the instrument will be approved and the 
resulting breath samples will be deemed valid for evidentiary use. 
S.2.1 Intoxilyzer 5000/EN performance verification is run using 0.08 and/or 
0.20 performance verification solutions provided by and/or approved by 
ISPFS. 
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5.2.2 During each evidentiary breath alcohol test using the lntoxilyzer 5000/EN, 
a performance verification will be perfonned as directed by the instrument 
testing sequence and recorded as SIM CHK on the printout. If the SIM 
CHK is not within the acceptable range for the solution lot being used, the 
testing sequence will abort and no breath samples will be obtained. 
5 .2.3 A two sample performance verification using a 0.08 performance 
verification solution should be run and results logged each time a 
solution is replaced with fresh solution. A 0.08 performance verification 
solution should be replaced with fresh solution approximately every 100 
samples or every calendar month, whichever comes first. 
5.2.4 A two sample performance verification using a 0..20 performance 
verification solution should be run and results logged once per calendar 
month and replaced with fresh solution approximately every 25 samples. 
The same bottle of0.20 solution may be used for several months. 
NOTE: The 0.020 performance verification was implemented for 
the sole purpose of supporting the instruments results for a 18-
8,004c charge. In the absence of an 18-8004c charge, the 0.20 
verification, or lack thereof, shall have no relevance to the results 
or the evidentiary value of the evidentiary test. 
5.2.5 Acceptable results for a 0.080 or 0.20 performance verification is a pair of 
samples in sequence that are both within +/- 10% of the perfonnance 
verification solution target value. Target values and ranges of acceptable 
results for each solution lot series are included in a certificate of analysis, 
prepared by, and available from, the ISPFS. 
NOTE: Due to external factors associated with changing a 
performance verification solution ( examples include: ambient air 
in the sample chamber, temperature fluctuation) the results of the 
initial performance verification may not be within the acceptable 
range, therefore the performance verification may be repeated until 
a pair of satisfactory results are obtained however, if results after a 
total of three nms for any solution ( equivalent to six tests) are still 
unsatisfactory, contact the appropriate ISPFS Laboratory. The 
instrument should not be used for evidentiary testing until the 
problem is corrected and performance verification results are 
within the acceptable range. Follow the suggested troubleshooting 
procedure if the initial performance verification does not meet the 
acceptance criteria. 
5.2.6 The official time and date of the perfonnance verification is the time and 
date recorded on the printout, or the time and date recorded in the log. 
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5.2.7 Perfonnance verification solutions should only be used prior to the 
expiration date as marked on the label. 
5.2.8 Temperature of the simulator must be between 33.5°C and 34.5°C in order 
for the perfonnance verification results to be valid. 
5.2.9 An agency may run additional performance verification solution levels at 
their discretion. 
S.2.10 The BTS must set the correct acceptable range limits and performance 
verification solution lot number in the instrument before proceeding with 
evidentiary testing. 
6. Evidentiary Testing Procedure 
Proper testing procedure by certified operators is necessary in order to provide accurate 
results that will be admissible in court. Instruments used in Idaho measure alcohol in the 
breath, not the blood, and report results as grams of alcohol in 210 liters of breath. 
6.1 Prior to evidential breath alcohol testing, the subject/'mdividual should be 
monitored for at least fifteen (15) minutes. Any material which absorbs/adsorbs 
or traps alcohol should be removed from the mouth prior to the start of the 15 
minute waiting period. During the monitoring period the subjectfmdividual should 
not be allowed to smoke, driril4 eat, or belch/burp/vomit/regurgitate. 
NOTE: If a foreign object/material is left in the mouth during the entirety of the 
1 S minute monitoring peri~ any potential external alcohol contamination will 
come into equilibrium with the subject/individual's body water and/or dissipate so 
as not to interfere with the results of the subsequent breath alcohol test. 
6. 1. 1 The breath alcohol test must be administered by an operator currently 
certified in the use of the instrument used. 
6.1.2 False teeth, partial plates, or bridges installed or prescribed by a dentist or 
physician do not need to be removed to obtain a valid test. 
6.1.3 The operator may elect a blood test in place of the breath alcohol test if 
there is a failure to complete the fifteen minute monitoring period 
successfully. 
6.1.4 During the monitoring period, the operator must be alert for any event that 
might influence the accuracy of the breath alcohol test. 
6.1.4.1 The operator must be aware of the possible presence of mouth 
alcohol as indicated by the testing instrument. If mouth alcohol is 
suspected or indicated, the operator should begin another 1 s. 
minute waiting period before repeating the testing sequence. 
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6.1.4.2 If, during the 15-minute waiting period, the subject/individual 
vomits or regurgitates material from the stomach into the 
subjectfmdividual's breath pathway, the 15-minute waiting period 
must begin again. 
6.1.4.3 If there is doubt as to the events occurring during the 15 minute 
monitoring period, the officer should look at results of the 
duplicate breath samples for evidence of potential alcohol 
contamination. For clarification see section 6.2.2.2. 
6.2 A complete breath alcohol test includes two (2) valid breath samples taken 
during the testing sequence and preceded by air blanks. The duplicate breath 
samples should be approximately 2 minutes apart to allow for the dissipation of 
potential mouth alcohol contamination. 
NOTE:- A deficient or insufficient sample does not automatically 
invalidate a test sample. 
6.2.1 If the subjectfmdividual fails or refuses to provide a second or third 
adequate sample as requested by the operator, the single test result may be 
considered valid. 
6.2.1.1 The operator may repeat the testing sequence as required by 
circumstances. 
6.2.1.2 The operator should use a new mouthpiece for each series of tests. 
6.2.2 A third breath sample is required if the first two results differ by more than 
0.02. 
6.2.2.1 Unless mouth alcohol is indicated or suspected, it is not necessary 
to repeat the IS-minute waiting period to obtain a third breath 
sample. 
6.2.2.2 The results for a duplicate breath samples should correlate within 
0.02 to indicate the absence of alcohol contamination in the 
subject/individual's breath pathway, show consistent sample 
delivery, and indicates the absence of RFI as a contributing factor 
to the breath results. 
6.2.3 The operator should log test results and retain printouts for possible use in 
court. The log of the results or the instrument printouts can be used as the 
official legal record for court purposes. 
6.2.4 If a subjectfmdividual fails or refuses to provide a second or third sample 
as requested by the operator. the results obtained are still considered valid 
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by the ISPFS, provided the failure to supply the requested samples was 
the fault of the subject/individual and not the operator. 
6.2.5 If the second or third samples are lacking due to instrument failure, the 
operator should attempt to utilize another instrument or have blood drawn. 
7. Troubleshooting Procedure 
Proper testing procedure by certified operators is necessary in order to provide accurate 
results that will be admissible in court. Instruments used in Idaho measure alcohol in the 
breath, not the blood, and report results as grams of alcohol in 210 liters of breath. 
7.1 Performance verification: If, when performing the periodic performance 
verification, the instrument falls outside the limits of the verification. the 
troubleshooting guide should be used. 
NOTE: This is a guide for troubleshooting failed performance 
verifications and the procedure is recommended to streamline and isol~te 
the potential cause of the problem. Strict adherence to the guidelines is 
not required. 
7 .1.1 The three sources of error when performing the periodic performance 
verifications are in the simulator setup and operator technique, the 
simulator performance verification solution, and the instrument calibration 
itself. 
7 .1.2 If the first performance verification fails, the simulator setup and 
technique of the operator performing the verification should be evaluated. 
The simulator should be evaluated to ensure that it is hooked up properly, 
uses short hoses, is properly warmed, is within temperature, the operator 
blow technique is not too hard or soft, and that the operator does not stop 
blowing until after the sample is taken. 
7 .1.2.1 The performance verification should be run a second time 
7 .1.2.2 If the performance verification passes on the second try, the 
instrument passes the performance verification. 
7.1.3 If the second performance verification fails, then the performance 
verification solution should be evaluated. 
7.1.3.1 The performance verification solution should be changed to a fresh 
solution. 
7.1.3.2 The solution should be wanned for approximately 15 minutes, or 
until the temperature is within range, and the simulator lid is as 
warm as the simulator jar. 
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7.1.3.3 The perfonnance verification may then be repeated. 
7.1.4 If the third performance verification fails, then the only remaining source 
of error lies with the instrument itself. At this point the instrument must 
be taken out of service and sent to ISPFS or an approved service provider. 
7 .1.5 Upon return from service, the instrument should be evaluated by ISPFS 
before being put back into service. 
7.2 Thermometers: 
7.2.1 If a bubble forms in the thennometer, the operator or BTS can place the 
thermometer in a freezer to draw the mercury ( or equivalent) into the bulb of the 
thermometer. This should disperse the bubble. 
8. MIP/MIC Procedure 
Since the testing threshold (presence or absence) for a minor in possession/minor in 
consumption charge is different from an 18-8004 charge and the numeric thresholds, 
there is a different procedure associated with these special circumstances. In many 
instances, an underage drinking party may consist of multiple subjects/individuals that 
need to be tested and the sheer number of individuals does not lend itself to observing a 
15 minute waiting period for each person. The potential for "mouth alcohol" is still a 
factor and should be addressed in the testing sequence. 
8.1 15 minute observation period: At the officer's discretion, or as the circumstances 
dictate, the regular DUI procedure (Section 6) may be followed in order to obtain 
a breath sample from the subject/individual. Otherwise, a shortened procedure 
can be followed 
8.2 MIP/MIC procedure: 
8.2.1 The breath alcohol test must be administered by an operator currently 
certified in the use of the instrument used. 
8.2.2 False teeth, partial plates, or bridges installed or prescribed by a dentist or 
physician do not need to be removed to obtain a valid test. 
8.3 A complete breath alcohol test includes two (2) valid breath samples taken 
during the testing sequence and preceded by air blanks. The duplicate breath 
samples should be approximately 2 minutes apart to allow for the dissipation of 
potential mouth alcohol contamination. 
NOTE: A deficient or insufficient sample does not automatically 
invalidate a test sample. 
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8.3.1 If the subjectfmdividual fails or refuses to provide a second or third 
adequate sample as requested by the operator, the single test result may be 
considered valid. 
8.3.l .l The operator may repeat the testing sequence as required by 
circumstances. 
8.3.1.2 The operator should use a new mouthpiece for each series of tests. 
8.3.2 A third breath sample is required if the first two results differ by more than 
0.02 . 
8.3.2.1 The results for a duplicate breath samples should correlate within 
0.02 to indicate the absence of alcohol contamination in the 
subjectfmdividuals breath pathway, show consistent sample 
delivery~ and indicates the absence of RFI as a contributing factor 
to the breath results. 
8.3.3 The operator should log test results and retain printouts for possible use in 
court. The log of the results or the instrument printouts can be used as the 
official legal record for court purposes. 
8.3.4 If a subject/individual fails or refuses to provide a second or third sample 
as requested by the operator, the results obtained are still considered valid 
by the ISPFS, provided the failure to supply the requested samples was 
the fault of the subject/individual and not the operator . 
8.3.5 If the second or third samples are lacking due to instrument failure, the 
operator should attempt to utilize another instrument or have blood drawn. 
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